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In this dissertation I investigate management perceptions of audit quality.  Despite 
management’s key stakeholder role in the audit process, their impact in assessing and 
evaluating audit quality has been overlooked in the post-Sarbanes-Oxley environment.  
Although audit committees are charged with governance over the audit process, 
management influences auditors, and by extension audit quality, management both 
influences day-to-day interactions between the auditor and the audit client and exerts 
significant influence on the audit committee’s decision to retain an auditor for future 
engagements.  Thus, auditors are incentivized to understand how their actions are 
perceived by management.  For my overall research question, I ask what factors influence 
management perceptions of audit quality. 
I provide two major contributions to the literature.  First, I surveyed management 
about their perceptions of audit quality and how auditors are able to demonstrate audit 
quality on their engagements.  After coding these responses according to academic and 
regulatory frameworks of audit quality, I find that management focuses most heavily on 
input and process characteristics of the auditor and audit engagement when evaluating 
audit quality.  Output characteristics are important when defining audit quality, but are 
considerably less important to management in evaluating auditors.  Additionally, 
academics have typically overlooked the impact of interpersonal relationships between 
stakeholders in the audit process, but these relationships are important to management in 
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their evaluations of auditors. 
Second, I conducted an experiment that investigates how management views an 
auditor’s use of industry norms as a justification method for an audit adjustment under 
imprecise accounting standards.  I find that under more precise accounting standards, 
management evaluates audit quality based on the underlying accounting attributes of the 
transaction.  When accounting standards are less precise, management rates audit quality 
higher when auditors justify a decision using an industry norm regardless of the 
underlying attributes of the transaction.  Thus, when accounting standards are less precise 
(i.e., more principles-based), auditors may have an incentive to engage in herding 
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There are many important stakeholders in the audit process besides the auditors, 
such as audit committee members, management, investors, and regulators.  Each of these 
groups can influence auditor decisions, and each may have different opinions on what 
constitutes a quality audit.  In order to more fully understand the incentives and 
motivations that influence auditor decisions, we must understand the impact of these 
auditor decision making on these different groups.  I contribute to the accounting 
literature by investigating factors related to management perceptions of audit quality.   
The relationship between management and auditors was significantly impacted by 
the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX).  One key provision of SOX was to shift 
responsibility for the oversight of auditors, including the decision to hire and fire audit 
firms, from management to audit committees.  In theory, taking away the decision to hire 
and fire an auditor from management creates an environment in which auditors should be 
able to make decisions that are unpopular with management without risking the loss of a 
future revenue stream.  Despite this attempt by SOX to minimize management’s 
influence on auditors, management still plays a key role in the decision to hire and fire an 
auditor.  Additionally, management has a central role in the audit process.  Thus, 




quality remain important. 
Although SOX placed responsibility with the audit committees for the hiring and 
firing of auditors, management can and does still influence that decision.  Management 
spends much more time with an auditor than does the audit committee and has 
opportunities to see and evaluate audit work on a more frequent and intimate basis.  If 
management has concerns with the auditor’s work, they can easily share those concerns 
with the audit committee.  Although an audit committee makes an independent decision 
about the auditor, they would be negligent in their duties if they failed to consider 
concerns that arise through management.  Thus, it should not be surprising that 
management is still seen as the “driving force behind auditor appointments and 
terminations” (Cohen, Krishnamoorthy, & Wright 2010, 752).   
Management also has the most interaction with auditors on a day-to-day basis 
during the audit engagement.  DeFond and Zhang (2014) equate audit quality with 
earnings quality, and although management has ultimate responsibility over the financial 
statements, the formation of those statements is an evolving process.  Management 
typically creates a preliminary trial balance for the auditors to use in their beginning 
testwork.  As auditors find mistakes or areas of disagreement, they propose adjustments 
to the trial balance numbers.  Auditors and management will then typically enter a 
negotiation process in order to come to an agreement about how transactions should be 
recorded.  Management will also create the first draft of the final financial report, 
including the notes to the financials, but the entire report will be subject to the auditor’s 
review prior to release.  Auditors will suggest additions, deletions, or corrections to any 




management can be considered co-creators of the financial statements (Salterio 2012), 
and management perceptions of auditors can influence this working relationship.  
Interactions (and perceptions of interactions) between auditors and management 
can also play an important role in auditor decision making on an audit engagement.  
Trompeter (1994) finds that when client retention becomes more important to an 
auditor’s compensation, auditors become less likely to suggest adjustments that decrease 
net income.  Bennett and Hatfield (2012) find that when auditors perceive a social 
mismatch with management, they are less likely to follow up on questions.  They are also 
vaguer in the documentation of their testwork, which can impair a supervisor’s ability to 
perform an appropriate review of the initial testwork.  These actions have the potential to 
reduce the quality of the audit services provided, which subsequently can reduce the 
quality of the financial statements.   
I first reviewed the accounting literature to gain an understanding of what we 
already know about management’s influence on the audit process.  I focused especially 
on areas of audit quality and auditor-management interactions.  From this review, I 
identified two major questions that have yet to be addressed in accounting research.  
First, what factors are important to management for defining and evaluating audit 
quality?  Second, how does an auditor’s use of industry norms under imprecise 
accounting guidance impact management perceptions of audit quality?   
In order to address these questions, I used two different research methods.  First, I 
conducted a survey of management participants to better understand how they define 
audit quality and how auditors are able to demonstrate audit quality on an engagement.  I 




(CAQ) Audit Quality Indicators (AQI).  After coding responses according to several 
academic and regulatory audit quality frameworks, I find that auditors value input 
characteristics (e.g., knowledge and training, independence), process characteristics (e.g., 
appropriate tests, efficiency), and output characteristics (e.g., the audit report, 
recommendations to management) to differing degrees.  All three categories are used to 
define audit quality; however, when asked how auditors demonstrate audit quality, 
respondents focused most heavily on the input and process characteristics (including 
interaction characteristics such as communication between auditors and management).   
Second, I performed an experiment testing the impact of an auditor’s use of 
industry norms as a justification method for an adjustment to the financial statements 
under imprecise accounting standards.  Participants took the role of a controller for their 
company and evaluated auditor decisions to propose adjustments to the financial 
statements.  I manipulated the precision of the accounting framework, the justification 
method used by the auditor, and the aggressiveness of management’s preadjustment 
decision (which proxies for the quality of management’s initial decision).  I find that 
when accounting standards are more precise, management evaluates the auditor based on 
the accounting attributes of the decision and not on the justification method used.  When 
accounting standards are less precise, however, management evaluates audit quality as 
higher when auditors justify a decision using an industry norm, regardless of the 
underlying accounting attributes of the transaction in dispute.  This evaluation creates an 
incentive for auditors to engage in herding behavior, which occurs when auditors 
automatically fit accounting transactions to industry norms.  Herding behavior threatens 




transactions to be recorded based on their substance – by turning an industry norm into 
pseudo-authoritative guidance. 
The remainder of my dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter 2 is a literature 
review of the relevant accounting and psychology literature used, Chapter 3 presents the 
results of the audit quality survey, Chapter 4 is the main experiment on the impact of an 
auditor’s use of industry norms under imprecise accounting frameworks, and Chapter 5 








In this chapter I review the literature that is relevant to my overall research 
question of understanding management perceptions of audit quality.  First I review 
research on audit quality, and specifically stakeholder perceptions of audit quality.  
Second I discuss research on the impact of principles-based versus rules-based 
accounting standards.  Third I provide an overview of the Elaboration Likelihood Model, 
which is the underlying theoretical foundation for my main experiment.  Fourth I discuss 
the negotiation literature to the extent that it informs my use of an auditor’s proposed 
adjustment as an appropriate experimental scenario for my research question.  
 
Audit Quality 
Audit quality has been, and continues to be, one of the most important topics in 
auditing, both in industry and academia.  Several regulatory bodies are involved with 
projects that seek to define, measure, and/or evaluate audit quality, including the 
International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) (IAASB 2014), the 
United States Department of the Treasury (Treasury 2008), the Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) (PCAOB 2012, 2013), and the Center for Audit 
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Quality (CAQ) (CAQ 2013).  Audit firms have also prioritized audit quality with the 
release of annual audit quality reports (EY 2014; PwC 2014).  Unfortunately, no 
consensus definition of audit quality or its proxies has yet been reached.  In this first 
section I discuss several aspects of audit quality, including definitions, common proxies 
in academic research, and proposed frameworks, as well as perceptions of audit quality of 
various stakeholders in the audit process.   
 
Definitions of Audit Quality 
There are currently several different, though related, definitions of audit quality.  
In academic research, DeAngelo (1981, 186) defines audit quality as “the market-
assessed joint probability that a given auditor will both (a) discover a breach in the 
client’s accounting system, and (b) report the breach.”   Carcello, Hermanson, Neal, and 
Riley (2002) equate audit quality with the level of assurance provided.  This definition 
aligns with the Government Accountability Office’s (GAO) interpretation of audit 
quality, which is that audit quality  
refers to the auditor conducting the audit in accordance with generally accepted 
auditing standards (GAAS) to provide reasonable assurance that the audited 
financial statements and related disclosures are (1) presented in conformity with 
GAAP and (2) are not materially misstated whether due to errors or fraud. (GAO 
2003, 13)   
DeFond and Zhang (2014, 276) take this idea one step further by associating audit quality 
with financial statement quality in their definition, which is stated as "greater assurance 
that the financial statements faithfully reflect the firm's underlying economics, 
conditioned on its financial reporting system and innate characteristics."  The IAASB, on 
the other hand, focuses more on the auditor side of the equation.  They define audit 
quality as being achieved when engagement teams  
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exhibit appropriate values, ethics, and attitudes; [are] sufficiently knowledgeable, 
skilled, and experienced and [have] sufficient time allocated to perform the audit 
work; appl[y] a rigorous audit process and quality control procedures that 
compl[y] with law, regulation, and applicable standards; provide useful and 
timely reports; and interact appropriately with relevant stakeholders. (IAASB 
2014, 4) 
 
Audit Quality Proxies 
Due to the private nature of the audit process, proxies for audit quality typically 
focus on either outcome measures or auditor/firm characteristics.  Examples of outcome 
measures of audit quality include litigation or regulatory enforcement actions against 
auditors, correct issuance of a going concern opinion, and, under certain circumstances, 
auditor switches (Francis 2011).  These proxies are limited in the sense that they only 
effectively identify examples of poor audit quality. Alternatively, firm and/or auditor 
characteristics may provide opportunities to distinguish between different levels of audit 
quality.  These characteristics include auditor size (Teoh & Wong 1993), degree of 
independence of the auditor, as measured by fee dependence (Chung & Kallapur 2003), 
earnings quality of the financial statements (Francis, Maydew, & Sparks 1999; Chi, 
Huang, Liao, & Xie 2009), and industry expertise (Krishnan 2005). 
 
Frameworks for Evaluating Audit Quality 
Several frameworks have been recently developed in an attempt to organize 
current knowledge of audit quality and provide a template for evaluating and critiquing 
the level of audit quality provided by engagement teams.  These frameworks have been 





Francis (2011) focuses on identifying and categorizing the drivers of audit quality.  
He identifies six different units of analysis.  The first is audit inputs, and can refer to 
either the audit tests that are used (e.g., confirmations, analytical procedures) or 
characteristics of the engagement team personnel (e.g., skepticism or engagement team 
tenure).  The second is audit processes, which refers to the implementation of audit tests 
by the engagement team (e.g., fraud brainstorming sessions or the hours spent on an 
engagement).  The third unit of analysis is characteristics that relate to the audit firm 
(e.g., firm size, industry expertise, partner compensation, firm tenure on a specific client, 
firm industry expertise, and firm fee dependence).  The fourth unit of analysis is the audit 
industry and audit markets, which can refer to the structure of the audit market (oligopoly 
of Big X firms or concentration of markets) or structure of the industry in which an audit 
occurs.  The fifth unit is the impact of the institutions involved in the audit process.  This 
includes regulatory bodies (e.g., SEC, PCAOB, AICPA, IAASB, and state boards of 
accountancy), governance structures (e.g., client boards of directors and audit 
committees), and the legal environment under which an auditor operates.  The sixth unit 
of analysis is the economic consequences of audit outcomes (e.g., the information 
contained in audit reports, firm cost of capital, and analyst reports).  See Table 1 for the 
full model.  
 
Knechel et al. (2013) 
The second framework was developed by Knechel, Krishnan, Pevzner, Shefchik, 
and Velury (2013) and is described as a balanced scorecard approach.  This balanced 
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scorecard has four measures: inputs, process, outcomes, and context.  Inputs are focused 
on the characteristics of the audit team, such as skepticism, incentives, knowledge and 
expertise, and within-firm pressures.  The process measure relates to the characteristics 
that are inherent to the audit process, such as auditor judgments, risk assessments, 
analytical procedures, auditor-client negotiations, and the engagement review process.  
Outcomes deal with observable traits and/or reports that arise from the audit process, 
such as restatements, earnings quality, audit reports (e.g., going concern opinions) and 
regulatory reviews.  Finally, the characteristics that are associated with the context of the 
audit include abnormal audit fees, auditor tenure, partner compensation, and fee 
premiums.  See Figure 1 for the full model. 
 
DeFond & Zhang (2014) 
The third academic audit quality framework comes from DeFond and Zhang 
(2014).  Their framework is derived from an economic model in which audit quality is 
influenced by client demand and auditor supply.  Both client demand and auditor supply 
are subject to incentives and competencies.  Examples of client demand incentives 
include agency costs and regulation, while auditor incentives include reputation, 
litigation, and regulation.  Client demand competencies include audit committees and 
internal audit; auditor supply competencies include inputs to the audit process and 







The IAASB also released an audit quality framework in 2014.  This framework is 
focused on five elements: input factors, process factors, output factors, key interactions, 
and contextual factors.  The input, process, and output factors can be evaluated at the 
engagement, firm, and national (or jurisdictional) levels.  Input factors consist of two 
main categories: 1) exhibiting appropriate values, ethics, and attitudes, and 2) having 
sufficient knowledge, skill, and experience, and devoting sufficient time to an 
engagement.  Process factors focus on the audit process and quality control procedures.  
Output factors consist of any type of output generated by the audit process, such as audit 
opinions, auditor reports to management and those charged with governance, audited 
financial statements, and firm transparency reports.  Interactions relate to any 
communication between stakeholders in the audit process, which includes auditors, 
management, those charged with governance, regulators, and users.  Finally, contextual 
(also termed environmental) factors include regulation, business practices, financial 
reporting frameworks, information systems, corporate governance, and the litigation 
environment. See Figure 3 for the full model. 
 
CAQ (2014) 
The PCAOB has been working on a concept release on audit quality indicators for 
more than two years (Thomson Reuters 2014).  In advance of the PCAOB’s concept 
release, the CAQ released a paper identifying potential audit quality indicators (AQI) 
(CAQ 2014).  These AQIs are designed to assist audit committees in their oversight role 
in the audit process by providing metrics with which audit quality can be evaluated.  The 
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CAQ envisions these AQIs as a starting point in the audit quality discussion and is 
continuing to test and solicit feedback on their usefulness.   
The AQIs are divided into four categories.  The first is firm leadership and tone at 
the top, and it focuses on characteristics of the audit firm such as “the importance of audit 
quality, independence and objectivity, and [how the firm] holds itself accountable for the 
effectiveness of the audit firm’s system of quality control” (CAQ 2014, 3).  The second 
category is engagement team knowledge, experience, and workload, and it focuses on 
individual audit characteristics such as auditor knowledge, experience, training, amount 
of audit work assigned to specialists, and workloads of engagement team members.  The 
third category is monitoring, and it focuses on inspections processes (e.g., internal firm 
quality reviews and PCAOB inspections) that are designed to ensure compliance with 
firm and professional standards.  The fourth category is auditor reporting, which looks at 
outcome measures such as restatements and withdrawn internal control reports. 
 
Perceptions of Audit Quality 
Research into the perceptions of audit quality generally falls into one of two 
categories: 1) survey research that seeks to understand overall perceptions, and 2) 
behavioral research that focuses on specific settings and circumstances.  Each of these 
two types of research is discussed here. 
 
Survey Research in Audit Quality 
Schroeder, Solomon, and Vickrey (1986) surveyed audit partners and audit 
committee chairs from Fortune 500 companies and asked them to rate 15 factors in terms 
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of their perceived impact on audit quality.  These factors were composed of both 
engagement team factors (e.g., level of partner/manager attention given to the audit, 
planning and conduct of the audit work, and communication between the audit team and 
management), and firm-wide factors (e.g., provisions to keep auditors up-to-date 
technically, quality control procedures of the audit firm, and regulatory agency expertise 
of the audit firm).  Responses indicate that both audit committee chairs and audit partners 
generally rate engagement team factors as more important indicators of audit quality.  
Interestingly, three factors average a slight impact rating: litigation the firm has been 
involved in, recentness and outcome of peer review, and relative significance of total 
professional fees.  Despite the lack of perceived importance by partners and audit 
committee chairs, these three factors are consistently cited in the academic literature as 
indicators of audit quality (or lack thereof). 
Carcello, Hermanson, and McGrath (1992) extended the work of Schroeder et al. 
(1986) by adding additional audit quality factors to their survey and distributing it to 
audit partners, Fortune 1000 controllers, and sophisticated investors.  Similar to 
Schroeder et al. (1986), they find that characteristics related to the engagement team are 
perceived as being more important to audit quality than are characteristics related to the 
audit firm.  Overall, the four most important factors are: engagement team and firm 
experience with the client, responsiveness to the client’s needs, industry expertise, and 
compliance with general standards (competence, independence, and due care).   
Although these studies are important in understanding audit quality, both surveys 
were conducted prior to the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX).  Due to enormous 
changes that SOX implemented in the auditing process, attitudes and perceptions of audit 
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quality may have changed since these studies were conducted.  Christensen, Glover, 
Omer, and Shelley (2014) have a working paper that investigates more recent perceptions 
of audit quality from the perspective of audit partners and sophisticated investors.  They 
find that, when evaluating audit quality, auditors focus on compliance with the 
professional regulations and standards; however, the investors focus more on the 
individual characteristics of the auditors on the engagement team.  These responses 
appear to indicate that auditors are placing an increased focus on the technical aspects of 
an audit during the post-SOX era. Investors, who have limited insight into the audit 
process, are still focusing on individual characteristics.  Despite the differences between 
the groups in what constitutes audit quality, both groups agree that restatements are the 
best indicator of low audit quality. 
 
Behavioral Research in Audit Quality 
Most of the behavioral research that has investigated how auditor decisions 
impact perceptions of audit quality has been in the litigation stream of research and uses 
judges and/or jurors as the participant group.  Kadous (2000) finds that jurors are subject 
to outcome effects (also known as hindsight bias) and are swayed by the severity of the 
outcome of an auditor’s decision, rather than by the quality of the work performed.  
Research has also identified actions that can be taken to reduce the impact of this 
outcome bias.  For instance, when jurors use the debiasing technique of having to 
evaluate two separate alternatives and assess the probability for the occurrence of either 
outcome, they are less likely to exhibit hindsight bias (Lowe and Reckers 1994).  
Additionally, Cornell, Warne, and Eining (2009) find that auditors can use either apology 
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or first-person justification during the testimony phase of a trial to mitigate jurors’ 
perceptions of negligence.   
Other studies have investigated methods that auditors can incorporate into the 
audit process in order to increase perceptions of quality.  Buckless and Peace (1993) find 
that jurors attribute less blame to auditors who comply with government standards than 
auditors who comply with auditor established standards.  Lowe, Reckers, and 
Whitecotton (2002) find that auditors who comply with a highly reliable firm decision aid 
are attributed less responsibility for negative events than auditors who override a decision 
aid, even if the decision aid is ultimately incorrect.  Kadous and Mercer (2012) find that 
auditors’ use of industry norms can provide safe harbor protections against litigation 
when accounting standards are imprecise.  Boyle (2014) finds that industry norms are 
perceived as a higher quality justification method for decisions than either an auditor’s 
professional judgment or firm interpretive guidance, regardless of the precision of the 
accounting standard.  Additionally, he finds that jurors do not perceive a difference in 
quality between professional judgment and firm interpretive guidance.  Grenier, 
Pomeroy, and Stern (2015) find that an auditor’s use of judgment frameworks can be 
effective in reducing an expectations gap.  They find that auditors using judgment 
frameworks receive lower attributions of blame, especially under imprecise standards.  
Reffett (2010) finds that auditors who perform additional procedures, but fail to discover 
a mistake, are perceived as more negligent than auditors who failed to even perform those 





Rules-Based and Principles-Based Standards 
On July 30, 2002, the United States’ Congress passed Public Law 107-204, better 
known as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, or SOX.  This act is best known for creating 
the PCAOB, requiring auditors to perform and report on tests of controls for audit clients, 
prohibiting auditors from providing certain nonaudit services to audit clients, and 
mandating audit partner rotation.  Although less well-known, SOX also directed the SEC 
to study the feasibility of adopting principles-based standards in the United States (U.S. 
Congress 2002).  In their report to Congress, the SEC recommended that accounting 
standards should be more consistently developed on a principles-based basis.1  Specific 
characteristics of these frameworks include: a consistently applied conceptual framework, 
clearly stated objectives, sufficient detail for the standard to be operationalized and 
applied consistently, minimization of exceptions from the standard, and avoidance of the 
use of bright-line tests (SEC 2003).   
During the same timeframe, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) 
and International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) met in Norwalk, Connecticut and 
agreed to work together in an effort to make their respective accounting standards as 
compatible as possible (FASB 2002).  The SEC followed up on this agreement by issuing 
a roadmap in 2008 that outlined a proposed path for the United States to require the use 
of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) for United States’ issuers by 2014 
(SEC 2008).   Although the roadmap hasn’t been fully implemented, and United States 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (US GAAP) remains the required accounting 
                                                 
1 Congress also used the term “objectives-oriented” for this type of a framework.  As they appear 
to be intended to mean the same thing, I will use the more common term “principles-based.” 
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framework for public companies in the United States, the FASB and IASB have reached 
converged solutions for revenue recognition, inventory accounting, segment reporting, 
share-based payments, and more, and they are still working on issues surrounding 
impairment and insurance contracts (IASB and FASB 2012, 2013).  Additionally, the 
United States is expected to continue to follow the recommendations of the SEC by 
working together with the IASB to find principles-based solutions for new accounting 
standards. 
Two of the characteristics of a good principles-based framework, as identified by 
the Global Public Policy Symposium, are: 1) that it provides a faithful presentation of 
economic reality, and 2) that it allows for the use of reasonable judgment (GPPS 2008).   
Rules-based standards, on the other hand, may allow companies to structure transactions 
in a manner that obscures their true nature (FASC 2003).  According to Robert Herz, 
former chairman of the FASB, these opportunities to exploit loopholes arise from the 
bright-line tests, exceptions to rules, and detailed implementation guidance that 
characterize rules-based standards (Businessweek 2002).  
Recent research on the impact of the proposed shift from a more rules-based 
framework to a principles-based framework has focused on how the accounting 
framework impacts initial management decisions.  Management has been found to make 
less aggressive decisions when operating under less precise accounting standards (Psaros 
& Trotman 2004; Agoglia, Doupnik, & Tsakumis 2011), although Jamal and Tan (2010) 
find that, under a principles-based standard, management’s aggressive decisions are only 
constrained when the auditors also have a principles-based mindset.   
Other research has focused on how auditors react to management decisions under 
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the different frameworks.  Trompeter (1994) finds that auditors are more likely to 
propose a downward adjustment to financial statements when accounting standards are 
more specific, and Backof, Bamber, and Carpenter (2014) find that auditors allow more 
aggressive reporting when accounting standards are less precise.  These studies provide 
some evidence that specificity in the financial statements provides an auditor with a 
stronger or more convincing argument when disagreements about accounting treatments 
arise.  Conversely, other research has found that auditors are more likely to constrain 
aggressive reporting under a principles-based framework (Agoglia, Doupnik, & 
Tsakumis 2011; Cohen, Krishnamoorthy, Peytcheva, & Wright 2013).  Ng and Tan 
(2003) show that authoritative guidance becomes more important as the strength of the 
audit committee decreases, which may help to explain the differences in the findings of 
these papers. 
 
The Elaboration Likelihood Model 
The Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM) dates back almost 30 years and has 
been used extensively in many different disciplines.  I do not attempt to provide a 
complete literature review of the ELM in this paper; rather, I focus on the development of 
the ELM and its use as a theoretical model in the accounting literature. 
 
Development of the ELM 
The ELM is a model that describes how individuals process persuasive 
information and was initially developed by Petty and Cacioppo (1986), although it has 
roots in earlier literature.  As constructed by Petty and Cacioppo (1986), the ELM has the 
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following seven postulates: 
1. People are motivated to hold correct opinions (p. 127). 
2. Although people want to hold correct attitudes, the amount and nature of issue-
relevant elaboration in which people are willing to able to engage to evaluate a 
message vary with individual and situational factors (p. 128). 
3. Variables can affect the amount and direction of attitude change by: (A) serving 
as persuasive arguments, (B) serving as peripheral cues, and/or (C) affecting the 
extent or direction of issue and argument elaboration (p. 132). 
4. Affecting motivation and/or ability to process a message in a relatively objective 
manner can do so by either enhancing or reducing argument scrutiny (p. 138). 
5. As motivation and/or ability to process arguments is decreased, peripheral cues 
become relatively more important determinants of persuasion.  Conversely, as 
argument scrutiny is increased, peripheral cues become relatively less important 
determinants of persuasion (p. 152). 
6. Variables affecting message processing in a relatively biased manner can produce 
either a positive (favorable) or negative (unfavorable) motivational and/or ability 
bias to the issue-relevant thoughts attempted (p. 163). 
7. Attitude changes that result mostly from processing issue-relevant arguments, 
(central route) will show greater temporal persistence, greater prediction of 
behavior, and greater resistance to counterpersuasion than attitude changes that 
result mostly from peripheral cues (p. 175). 
These postulates combine to create two possible routes along which individuals 
may process persuasive information – the central route and the peripheral route.  The 
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central route is used for systematic processing, which is more thoughtful and effortful, 
while the peripheral route is characterized by heuristic processing and relies more on 
external cues and mental shortcuts.  In order to exert the extra effort required to engage in 
systematic processing, individuals must have both motivation and ability (collectively 
termed elaboration).  If either of these characteristics is missing, individuals are more 
likely to use the less effortful heuristic processing.   See Figure 4 for the ELM model.  
Petty, Haugtvedt, and Smith (1995) document various determinants of both 
motivation and ability.  The major determinant of motivation is personal relevance2 
(Johnson & Eagly 1989; Petty & Cacioppo 1979, 1990), which has often been proxied by 
asking college students about their opinions on a change to some type of university policy 
that will either be enacted at their own university or another university, or will be enacted 
in either the near or distant future (Petty & Cacioppo 1984).  An evaluator’s motivation 
may also be increased when the message is more surprising, such as when an expert 
provides a weak argument (Maheswaran & Chaiken 1991) or when an individual 
disagrees with a majority (Baker & Petty 1994), when multiple sources, rather than an 
individual source, present an argument (Harkins & Petty 1987), or when evaluators have 
an increased need for cognition (Cacioppo & Petty 1982).  Additionally, increasing the 
personal responsibility of the evaluator, such as by being the sole evaluator rather than a 
member of an evaluation team (Petty, Harkins, & Williams 1980) or being required to 
discuss an evaluation (Tetlock 1990) can increase motivation. 
                                                 
2 Johnson and Eagly (1989) divide personal relevance into three categories: value-relevant, 
impression-relevant, and outcome-relevant.  Outcome relevant messages are messages that apply to 
situations in which a persuasive message is salient to the goals of outcomes of the message evaluator.  This 
is the type of personal relevance that I focus on in this paper. 
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There are also multiple determinants of ability.  I categorize the determinants of 
ability into three categories: Internal, Environmental, and Message characteristics.  
Internal characteristics relate to characteristics of the evaluator, such as cognitive 
depletion (Sanbonmatsu & Kardes 1988) and technical ability and knowledge (Wood, 
Kallgren, & Priesler 1985).  Environmental characteristics relate to the surroundings of 
the evaluator, such as distraction (Festinger & Maccoby 1964) and level of 
relaxation/comfort (Petty, Wells, Heesacker, Brock, & Cacioppo 1983).  Message 
characteristics relate to the processed message and include incomprehensibility/ambiguity 
(Ratneshwar & Chaiken 1991), complexity (Cacioppo & Petty 1989), and delivery speed 
(Moore, Hausknecht, & Thamodran 1986). 
 
The Elaboration Likelihood Model in Accounting Research 
 Although the ELM has not been used extensively in prior accounting research, it 
has served as the theoretical foundation for understanding how accountants evaluate 
differences and make decisions.  Goodwin (1999) finds that auditors are sensitive to the 
integrity of both client management and external sources, especially when evidence 
received from both sources is inconsistent.  Alexander (2003) finds that tax accountants 
will spend more time reviewing a memo from a lower credibility source if there is a 
lower probability of bias in the memo, but if there is a higher probability of bias, more 
time will be spent on a memo from a higher credibility source.   
Source credibility is not the only factor that influences persuasion in accounting 
research.  Bhattacharjee, Moreno, and Riley (2012) find that auditors who have a positive 
affect toward a client evaluate inventory obsolescence for both lower and higher 
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competence clients similarly.  Burton, Emett, Simon, and Wood (2012) find that 
managers are more likely to be persuaded by in-house internal audit recommendations 
than outsourced internal audit recommendations and that quantified arguments from in-
house internal auditors are more persuasive than nonquantified arguments.  Glover, 
Prawitt, and Wilks (2005) find that a simple prompt to auditors to more critically 
examine evidence may lead to a stronger consideration of that evidence.  Magro (2005) 
finds that more institutional knowledge can lead to broader information search, and Rich 
(2004) finds that auditor elaboration is greater when auditors are reviewing more critical 
audit activities.    
 
Auditor-Client Negotiations 
In an auditor-client negotiation setting, auditors find and present a potential 
adjustment to the client’s financial statements.  In this situation, clients often wish to 
avoid making changes to their financial statements, and a negotiation process ensues until 
both auditor and client can agree on a resolution to the proposed adjustment.3   
The stream of negotiation literature began with Antle and Nalebuff (1991), who 
published a theoretical model of negotiation that was designed to show that the final 
financial statement product did not always reflect a conservative position.  The unique 
position taken by these authors is that the financial statements are a joint product of the 
auditors and management, rather than solely management.  Salterio (2012) refers to these 
                                                 
3 This resolution may be any of the following: the client accepts the auditor adjustment, the auditor 
determines the adjustment is not material to the financial statements, the auditor and client agree on a 
compromise adjustment, or the client convinces the auditor that the original accounting is correct and no 
adjustment is necessary.  In rare situations, the auditor and client may not be able to come to an agreement.  
If this occurs, the auditor would issue a qualified or adverse opinion.  
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two groups as co-creators of the financial statements.   
In the intervening years, the negotiation process associated with proposed audit 
adjustments has been used as an appropriate experimental setting to look at different 
research questions – typically those that investigate how different negotiation tactics or 
environmental characteristics change audit outcomes.  For instance, Wang and Tuttle 
(2009) investigate the impact of mandatory audit rotation on negotiation tactics, Bame-
Aldred and Kida (2007) investigate the impact of the degree of flexibility in auditor and 
client initial negotiating positions, and Sanchez, Agoglia, and Hatfield (2007) investigate 
the impact of auditors’ use of a reciprocity-based negotiation strategy.     
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Figure 1 – Indicators of Audit Quality from Knechel et al. (2013). Adapted from: Knechel et al. (2013).  
Inputs 
 Incentives and motivation 
 Professional skepticism 
 Knowledge and expertise 
 Within-firm pressures 
Process 
 Judgment in the audit process 
 Audit production 
 Assessing risk 
 Analytical procedures 
 Obtaining and evaluating 
evidence 
 Auditor-client negotiations 
 Review and quality control 
Outcomes 
 Adverse outcomes 
o Restatements 
o Litigation 
 Financial reporting quality 
o Discretionary accruals 
o Accounting conservatism 
 Audit reports 
 Regulatory reviews of audit 
firms 
Context 
 Audit partner compensation 
 Abnormal audit fees 
 Non-audit fees 
 Audit fee premium – Big N auditors and industry specialists 
 Auditor tenure 
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Figure 3 – IAASB Framework for Audit Quality from IAASB (2014). Adapted 





















































Audit quality is a key issue faced by the audit and accounting industries, as 
evidenced by recent audit quality projects undertaken by the Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board (PCAOB), International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board 
(IAASB), and the Center for Audit Quality (CAQ).4  The European Union requires audit 
firms to file a public report that includes audit quality indicators, and the United States 
Department of Treasury has recommended that large audit firms issue a similar report 
(Treasury 2008).  In response to this recommendation, audit firms have begun voluntarily 
releasing this information (EY 2014; PwC 2014).  Audit quality has also been an 
important topic in academic research, as evidenced by the recent publication of three 
separate frameworks for evaluating current and future audit quality research (Francis 
2011; Knechel et al. 2013; DeFond & Zhang 2014).  Although each of these frameworks 
offers a unique perspective on audit quality, they all agree that more research is necessary 
                                                 
4 The PCAOB released a strategic plan for improving the relevance and quality of the audit in 
2013 (PCAOB 2013); the IAASB released an audit quality framework (IAASB 2014), and the CAQ 
released a set of proposed audit quality indicators (CAQ 2014). 
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to improve our understanding of what it is and how it can be improved.  
There are also many stakeholders in the audit process who have the opportunity to 
influence audit quality.  One key stakeholder that has been relatively overlooked is 
management of audit clients.  Although Sarbanes-Oxley shifted much of the 
responsibility of and oversight for the audit to the members of the audit committee, 
management still plays a central role in the audit process.  Cohen et al. (2010, 752) find 
that auditors still perceive management to be the “driving force behind auditor 
appointments and terminations.”  Additionally, management has significant interaction 
with auditors throughout an audit engagement and typically assumes a key coordinating 
role between auditor and client.  Furthermore, Bennett and Hatfield (2013) show that 
auditor perceptions of management can influence auditor engagement decisions.  Thus, 
understanding how management perceives audit quality can provide insight into auditor 
incentives and motivations, which in turn impacts actual audit quality. The purpose of 
this paper is to provide insight from management on their view of audit quality and to 
determine how their perspective relates to current audit quality frameworks. 
I survey members of management5 regarding their perceptions of audit quality 
and ways that auditors are able to demonstrate audit quality on an engagement.  I then 
code those responses according to recently published audit quality frameworks in order to 
organize the responses and identify strengths and weaknesses of each framework.  
Additionally, I ask participants to rate the importance of the CAQ’s Audit Quality 
Indicators (AQI) to provide some early feedback on the value of the AQIs. 
                                                 
5 I define management as individuals who have some responsibility over the financial reporting 
process for their company and/or interaction with their company’s auditors.  See the Research Design 
section for demographics of participants. 
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Results indicate that management participants define audit quality based primarily 
on personal characteristics of the auditor (e.g., independence, integrity, knowledge), 
process factors (e.g., efficiency and effectiveness of the audit tests), and outcomes of the 
audit (e.g., the final audit report and recommendations provided to management and/or 
the audit committee).  When asked how auditors demonstrate audit quality, however, 
participants primarily focused on auditor characteristics and process factors, but they 
rarely mentioned the outcome factors.  Proxies that are commonly used in academic 
research, such as discretionary accruals or conservatism, or outcome based measures such 
as litigation or restatements, were rarely mentioned by participants as either a definition 
or determinant of audit quality.  Additionally, after comparing and contrasting several of 
the current audit quality frameworks, I find that some frameworks [e.g., DeFond & 
Zhang (2014); CAQ (2014)] may be insufficient for understanding management 
perspectives of audit quality.6  Also, current academic frameworks may, to some degree, 
be overlooking characteristics related to interpersonal relationships between auditors 
despite management placing a high value on those characteristics. 
I find similar results when evaluating which of the CAQ’s AQIs management 
found to be most helpful in evaluating audit quality.  The highest rated AQIs were the 
knowledge and experience of the audit team, the audit firm leadership and tone at the top, 
and the involvement of specialists in significant risk areas.  Alternatively, the results of 
the PCAOB’s inspection reports were rated as much less important for evaluating audit 
quality.  This may be especially helpful for the CAQ, as their AQI project as currently 
                                                 
6 This is not meant to imply that they are less valuable.  Both frameworks have unique strengths 
that can provide great value in other settings. 
32 
 
published is meant to generate discussion on audit quality, rather than provide a final 
determination on the topic. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows.  The Background and 
Research Question section discusses the relevant audit quality frameworks and proposes 
the addressed research questions.  The Results reviews the research design used.  The 
Discussion of Results section presents the analysis of the survey responses and discusses 
the implications of the results, and the Conclusion section provides concluding remarks, 
including opportunities for future research. 
 
Background and Research Questions 
Despite the importance of audit quality, there is no universally agreed upon 
definition of what it is or how it is measured.  The most commonly cited definition of 
audit quality in academic research comes from DeAngelo (1981) and states that audit 
quality is based on the probability that an auditor will both discover and report an error in 
the financial statements.  Although this definition works well in theory, measuring audit 
quality has proven to be difficult, likely due in large part to the unobservable nature of 
most audit processes.  One way to proxy for audit quality is to use different observable 
outcomes, such as restatements, litigation against auditors, poor PCAOB reviews, or SEC 
Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAER) (Francis 2011).  Unfortunately 
(for the sake of research) these outcomes are relatively rare and only provide a signal for 
situations that occur on the very low end of an audit quality continuum.  Another method 
used in research is to focus on characteristics of the auditors performing the work.  These 
characteristics include: Big N versus non-Big N auditors (Teoh and Wong 1993), audit 
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firm industry expertise (Krishnan 2005), and auditor reliance upon fees from particular 
client (Chung and Kallapur 2003).  DeFond and Zhang (2014) equate audit quality with 
financial statement quality.  This premise allows audit quality to be studied through the 
lens of earnings quality, which often looks at discretionary and abnormal accruals 
(Francis et al.1999) or earnings response coefficients (Chi et al. 2009). 
Although the above proxies for audit quality are appropriate for academic 
research that studies the outcomes associated with audit quality, they do not provide 
insight into actual evaluations of the audit process.  Management is uniquely situated to 
evaluate audit processes due to their interactions on the engagement.  Management 
perceptions of audit quality are important because they can influence auditor incentives 
and motivations.  Carcello et al. (1992) provided the best evidence about what factors 
drive management perceptions of audit quality in the auditor-client relationship by 
surveying controllers.  They find that controllers focus most heavily on personal 
characteristics of the auditor and relationship interactions, such as good communication, 
when evaluating audit quality.  Unfortunately, this survey occurred over 20 years ago and 
much has changed in the audit profession in the intervening years.7  Thus, there is an 
opportunity to provide fresh insight into management perceptions of audit quality.  My 
first two research questions focus on how managers view audit quality, both theoretically 
and functionally. 
 RQ1: How does management define audit quality? 
 RQ2: How can auditors demonstrate audit quality on an engagement? 
 
                                                 




Academic research has recently developed several frameworks that may prove 
useful for categorizing and analyzing responses to these questions (Francis 2011; 
Knechel et al. 2013; DeFond & Zhang 2014).  Each of these frameworks will be 
discussed in more detail below. 
 
Francis (2011)  
Francis (2011, 125) “presents a general framework for studying factors associated 
with engagement-level audit quality.”  Although its overall purpose is to organize current 
archival research, its focus on engagement-level factors makes it an appropriate and 
effective framework for analyzing management perceptions of audit quality because 
management has significant interaction with auditors during the engagement process.  
This framework is organized into six units of analysis: audit inputs, audit 
processes, accounting firms, audit industry and audit markets, institutions, and economic 
consequences of audit outcomes.  Audit inputs consist of two inputs to the audit process: 
the audit testing procedures and the engagement team personnel.  Audit processes involve 
decisions and judgments made by the audit team related to the actual work performed on 
an engagement, including the audit tests selected, the evidence evaluated, and the opinion 
reached.  Accounting firms deals with the impact of a firm on hiring, training, and 
evaluating audit personnel, as well as any firm-specific requirements that audit teams 
must follow.  Audit industry and audit markets relate to the impact that the collective 
audit firms have on markets in general.  The institutions category considers the impact 
that outside organizations, such as regulatory bodies and a country’s litigation 
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environment, have on the conduct of an audit.  Finally, economic consequences of audit 
outcomes refers to the larger institutional context under which an audit operates.  See 
Table 1. 
 
Knechel et al. (2013) 
The goal of Knechel et al. (2013, 385) is to “review and synthesize the academic 
literature on audit quality and propose ideas for future research.”  This framework 
focuses on characteristics that are fundamental to an audit engagement, and it recognizes 
that audit quality is judged differently by the various stakeholders in the audit process.  
Thus, in order to better understand current research, this framework attempts to reconcile 
different viewpoints and “identify the fundamental characteristics” (p. 386) of audit 
quality.   
This framework uses a balanced scorecard approach that links quality indicators 
(incentives, uniqueness, process, uncertainty, and professional judgment) across four 
categories: inputs, processes, outcomes, and context.   The inputs category is for 
characteristics that relate primarily to the members of the audit team, such as 
independence, professional skepticism, knowledge, and expertise.  The audit processes 
category relates to processes involved in the actual engagement work, such as judgment, 
risk assessment, auditor-client negotiations, and engagement review.  The outcomes 
category is for observable outcomes of the audit, such as the financial statements, 
restatements, litigation, and regulatory reviews.  Finally, the context category relates to 
indicators such as partner compensation, audit fees, auditor size, auditor tenure, and 
market perceptions of the audit.  See Figure 1. 
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DeFond & Zhang (2014) 
DeFond and Zhang (2014, 279) define audit quality as “greater assurance of high 
financial reporting quality.” Thus, their framework is unique in the sense that it is 
structured around the supply and demand of audit services, and audit quality arises from 
factors related to auditors, their clients, and regulatory forces that influence both groups.   
Client demand characteristics are separated into two categories: incentives to 
demand quality and competency in meeting that demand.  Research on client incentives 
focuses on the moral hazard problem faced by companies and may look at factors such as 
the client’s choice to hire auditors with certain characteristics (e.g., audit firm size or 
industry specialization).  Client competencies research often focuses on corporate 
governance characteristics.  The auditor supply category is also separated into two 
categories: auditor incentives for independence and auditor competency.  Examples of 
incentives that auditors face to provide a quality audit include litigation and reputation 
risk.  Auditor competency would include training, review processes, and experience.  
Finally, regulatory pressures, such as the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley, influence both 
client demand and auditor supply.  See Figure 2. 
 
Regulatory Frameworks 
Regulatory bodies also seek to define and provide a framework for audit quality.  
The primary goal for these regulatory bodies is to provide a functional tool that different 






The main objectives of the IAASB’s framework include “raising awareness of the 
key elements of audit quality, encouraging stakeholders to explore ways to improve audit 
quality, and facilitating greater dialogue between key stakeholders” (IAASB 2014,  1).   
This framework establishes five factors.  Input factors include the characteristics 
of the auditor and are split into two subcategories: 1) values, ethics, and attitudes (e.g., 
objectivity, integrity, independence, and professional skepticism), and 2) knowledge, 
skills and experience, (e.g., judgments, understanding of the business and industry, 
training of audit staff, and partner involvement).  Process factors relate to the 
performance of audit testwork and the quality control procedures put into place in an 
audit firm. Examples include compliance with auditing standards, use of information 
technology, and documentation.  Output factors are the formal reports that result from an 
audit engagement, such as financial statements and opinions, management letters, and 
reports to those charged with governance.  The key interactions factor relates to the 
relationships between key stakeholders in the audit process, such as auditors, 
management, users of the financial statements, those charged with governance, and 
regulators.  Finally, contextual factors are the environmental factors that impact an audit, 
such as culture, litigation environment, reporting deadlines, and financial reporting 
frameworks.  See Figure 3. 
 
CAQ (2014) 
Recently, the PCAOB initiated a project designed to “identif[y] measures for 
analyzing key aspects behind the quality of public company auditing…[to] provide 
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additional insight for audit committees, investors, and others and thus encourage audit 
firms to compete on the basis of audit quality” (PCAOB 2013, 1).  In response to the 
PCAOB’s call for measures that provide additional insight into audit quality (PCAOB 
2013), the CAQ released a proposed list of AQIs in April 2014.   
The AQIs, as devised by the CAQ, are grouped into four categories.  The first 
category is firm leadership and tone at the top, and relates to how audit firm leadership 
establishes and communicates an attitude of high quality to employees.  The second 
category is engagement team knowledge, experience, and workload, and covers areas 
such as the knowledge and experience of audit team personnel, the training requirements 
established by audit firms, the number of hours worked by audit staff, and the 
involvement of firm specialists.  The third category is monitoring, and it includes audit 
firm internal quality reports and PCAOB inspection reports.  The fourth category is 
auditor reporting, and it focuses on reissuance restatements and withdrawn audit 
opinions.  See Table 2 for a full list of the AQIs. 
These AQIs were and are intended to be a beginning point in the discussion on 
audit quality, and the CAQ continues to solicit feedback on their relevance, as well as 
encourage research in this area (CAQ 2015).  As discussed earlier, management is an 
important stakeholder in the audit process, and their feedback on the AQIs can help to 
provide a more complete understanding of their value.  Thus, I propose a third research 
question: 
 RQ3:  How does management rate the value of each of the CAQ’s AQIs in 






To answer these research questions, I surveyed current and former members of 
management.  Participants were contacted by email using the accounting alumni8 
database of a large public university in the western United States.  Each participant was 
provided with a link to an online survey administered through Qualtrics.9   Each 
participant was asked three screening questions before beginning the instrument. These 
questions were used to identify participants who had management experience and were 
not currently employed by a public accounting firm.  Participants who completed the 
instrument were offered a choice to either receive $10 in an electronic Amazon gift 
certificate or to donate $10 to one of four charitable organizations.10 
The initial email list contained 3,678 unique alumni,11 although 125 of the initial 
emails were returned as undeliverable.  Of that group, 373 (10%) individuals opened the 
survey link to the experimental materials.  Of those 373, 82 had inappropriate 
professional backgrounds, as determined by the screening questions that participants 
initially answered,12 leaving 291 participants.  Of these 291, another 100 exited the 
                                                 
8 The list included alumni in both the bachelors in accounting and masters of accountancy 
programs. 
9 The audit quality survey was administered in conjunction with an experiment on the impact of 
industry norms on management perceptions of audit quality, which is described in Chapter 4. 
10 Overall, 46% chose the gift card and 46% chose the charitable donation (the remaining 
individuals chose neither option).  The four charities, and the percentage of participants who donated (out 
of total donating participants), are the University of Utah Business School Scholarship Fund (69%), the 
American Red Cross (2%), the Huntsman Cancer Institute (25%), and Habitat for Humanity (3%). 
11 Participants were also invited to forward the email to acquaintances with similar professional 
and educational backgrounds. 
12 Of the 82 who were eliminated based on their professional background, 46 (56%) were currently 
employed in public accounting and 57 (70%) lacked professional interaction with external auditors.  Some 
individuals responded by email with a reason why they were declining to participate.  The most common 
reason provided was a professional background in an area outside of audit or accounting (i.e., lawyer, tax 
CPA, financial advisor, etc.). 
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instrument prior to completion and were removed from the analysis, leaving 191 




Once participants reached the survey portion of the instrument, they were asked 
two open-ended questions: 
1. Please describe what “Audit Quality” means to you. 
2. Please describe way(s) that external auditors have demonstrated high audit 
quality.  Please focus only on interactions that you have had with auditors 
during a time you were employed with the auditor's client. 
After answering these questions, participants were shown the CAQ’s AQIs and 
asked to rate, on a five-point Likert-style scale, how valuable information in each of these 
categories would be in evaluating audit quality.   
 
Analysis 
Each of the responses to the two open-ended questions was coded separately in 
accordance with three of the five audit quality frameworks discussed previously: Francis 
(2011), Knechel et al. (2013), and IAASB (2014).  DeFond and Zhang (2014) and CAQ 
(2014) were not used because the focus of these frameworks was determined to be 
inconsistent with the responses.  The DeFond and Zhang (2014) framework equates audit 
quality with financial statement quality, which increases the emphasis on management’s 
                                                 
13 Of the 100 participants who dropped out prior to completion, 99 dropped out during the 
experiment portion and never viewed the survey questions.  
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role in audit quality.  Management responses were constrained to only two categories in 
the framework, which limited both differentiation of the responses and value of this 
framework in analyzing and understanding audit quality.  The CAQ AQIs were 
developed to identify tangible indicators of audit quality.  Intangible indicators of audit 
quality, such as communication with management, do not fit well in the current 
classification structure.  Additionally, the CAQ’s examples of outcome measures are 
limited only to negative outcomes such as restatements and PCAOB inspection failures.  
Thus, their framework fails to adequately account for many of management’s responses 
(e.g., audited financial statements and management reports). 
 
Results 
RQ1 and RQ2 
Responses to the two open-ended survey questions were coded separately 
according to the audit quality frameworks proposed by Francis (2011), Knechel et al. 
(2013), and IAASB (2014).  Responses contained references to at least one of the 
classification categories.     
When participants were asked to define audit quality, they most commonly 
provided responses that related to the conduct of the audit process itself (e.g., appropriate 
tests, applying reasonable judgment, and appropriate review).  Many participants also 
mentioned the characteristics of the auditor (e.g., independence, free from bias, sufficient 
knowledge and training) and output characteristics (e.g., financial statements that are free 
from misstatement and appropriate recommendations to management and/or the audit 
committee). When asked to explain how auditors demonstrated audit quality in their 
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work, respondents were still most likely to reference personal characteristics of the 
auditor and process factors; conversely, the outcome measures were mentioned much less 
often.  Full results are summarized in Tables 3-5. 
 
RQ3 
RQ3 seeks to understand how management views the CAQ’s AQIs.  Participants 
rated each AQI measure on a five-point Likert-style scale, with a score of 5 equating to 
an opinion that the AQI provides significant value in evaluating audit quality.  Similar to 
results from RQ1 and RQ2, the AQI with the highest mean score14 is the knowledge and 
experience AQI, which has a score of 4.48.  This is also the only AQI with both a median 
and mode of 5.  The next highest AQI scores belong to firm leadership and tone at the top 
(4.09, with median and mode of 4) and allocation of resources by significant risk areas 
(4.05, with median and mode of 4).  These AQIs are related to individual auditor 
characteristics and audit processes, respectively, which is consistent with the results from 
RQ1 and RQ2.  The AQI with the lowest score is the PCAOB inspection findings (3.36, 
median and mode of 3).  Overall, fewer than 50% of respondents felt that this AQI 
provides either significant or large value in evaluating audit quality, and approximately 




                                                 
14 Means are reported here under an assumption that the scale is functionally equivalent to an 





As previously noted, there is much current discussion surrounding the topic of 
audit quality, including multiple frameworks for evaluating audit quality.  Each of these 
frameworks has different strengths and weaknesses, and understanding some of 
similarities and differences among them may be valuable for understanding when to use 
one or another.  In order to understand how some of the frameworks are related, I 
performed a principal components analysis with a direct oblimin rotation on the 
responses to each of the two survey questions.    
I first analyzed Question 1, which asked participants to provide a definition of 
audit quality.  Although there were only 172 responses to analyze, the KMO measure is 
0.571 and the null hypothesis for Bartlett’s Test is rejected at p = 0.000.  The analysis 
generated 6 components with eigenvalues > 1.0, although components 5 and 6 are barely 
above 1.0 and, due to the low sample size and use of binary data, may not provide as 
much insight.  Component 1 (with loadings) is Auditor Characteristics, and it includes 
K115 (0.902), F2 (0.900), I1 (0.864), and I4 (0.377).  The lower loading for I4 actually 
highlights one strength of the IAASB framework, as there is a separate category for 
interactions between stakeholders in the audit process.  Many participants highlighted the 
important role of auditor communication, but that role was combined with general auditor 
characteristics in the other frameworks.  Component 2 includes I2 (-0.827), F3 (-0.755), 
and K2 (-0.732).  This is the Process component, and relates to the importance of 
different engagement processes, such as audit tests and supervisor review.  Component 3 
is Firm Characteristics, and it includes K4 (0.805) and F6 (0.786).  The absence of any 
                                                 
15 Category definitions are provided in Table 7. 
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factors from the IAASB framework highlights another of its unique characteristics.  The 
IAASB looks at each of its categories at an engagement, firm, and national level; thus, 
firm characteristics that are separately categorized in the academic frameworks are 
included throughout the other categories in the IAASB framework.  Thus, the correlations 
with the other factors are too low for any one of the IAASB factors to load on this 
component.  Component 4 is the Output component and includes K3 (0.847) and I3 
(0.786).  Interestingly, there is no category from the Francis (2011) framework included 
in the Output component.  This framework does not readily accommodate audit reports, 
since F6 focuses on the impact of firm reputation (e.g., Big 4 versus non Big 4) on an 
audit report’s quality and F10 focuses on the economic consequences of the report (e.g., 
reduced cost of capital), but none of the factors focuses primarily on the audit report 
itself.   
Question 2 asked participants to describe how auditors had demonstrated audit 
quality in prior engagements.  The KMO measure for the analysis is only 0.485, and 
though the null for Bartlett’s test is rejected at p = 0.000, the low KMO measure indicates 
the following analysis should be interpreted carefully.  The analysis revealed 6 
components with eigenvalues > 1.0.  Component 1 (with loadings) is again Auditor 
Characteristics and includes I1 (0.892), K1 (0.878) and F2 (0.682).  Component 2 is 
Process with I2 (0.870), F3 (0.810), and K2 (0.741).  The Output component includes I3 
(0.841) and F10 (0.768).  Even though K3 is grouped into Component 5, it also loads 
fairly well on Component 3 (0.418).  See Tables 8 and 9 for the correlations between the 




Discussion of Results 
Overall, management appears to focus most on auditor characteristics, the audit 
process, and outcomes from the audit when evaluating audit quality.  Interestingly, there 
are differences in how management responds to the questions “What does audit quality 
mean?” and “How do auditors demonstrate audit quality?”  When defining audit quality, 
management places a greater reliance on outcomes of the audit, such as the audit report 
itself and auditor suggestions to management on process and control improvements.  
These outcomes are much less frequently cited when management is asked how auditors 
demonstrate audit quality, which suggests that management evaluations of audit quality 
are more likely to be developed either before an engagement starts (through knowledge 
of auditor characteristics) or throughout the engagement (through interaction with and 
observation of audit processes) than at the completion of audit work (through an 
evaluation of the final work product).  This discrepancy may arise in part from the fact 
that a large majority of audit opinions are unqualified and thus provide no great 
differentiation for purposes of evaluation.  This is important for auditors to understand, 
however, since they have an incentive to demonstrate audit quality to management 
throughout the engagement in order to help retain clients for future audit engagements.   
Conversely, academic audit quality frameworks place greater importance on the 
impact of the audit industry, regulatory forces, litigation influences, and other contextual 
factors than does management.  These factors may have a real impact on auditors and 
auditor decision-making in other settings, but that influence is not recognized and/or 
prioritized by management.   
I find a similar pattern of results when evaluating management responses to the 
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CAQ’s AQIs.  Respondents rate an auditor’s knowledge and training as being extremely 
important in evaluating audit quality.  Firm tone at the top and the allocation of resources 
to significant risk areas are rated only slightly less.  At the other end of the spectrum, 
knowledge of the PCAOB inspection findings are rated as much less important.  PCAOB 
inspection reports are similar to audit opinions in that most reports do not document any 
issues and thus the typical report may not provide enough differentiation to be valuable in 
evaluating audit quality.  Again, auditors need to be aware that the biggest impact on 
perceptions of audit quality typically occur before and during an audit engagement, and 
they are judged least by the outcome of the audit.16   
One area in which the IAASB differs from the other frameworks is in including a 
category devoted to interactions between the different stakeholders of the audit process.  
This appears to be an important category, as many respondents cited their relationship 
with the auditors as important for evaluating audit quality.  Academic frameworks may 
not pay enough attention to the relationship side of audit quality, and this might be an 
area in which future research can provide valuable insights.  Additionally, Francis (2011) 
categorizes the hiring and training of employees under the firm category, rather than the 
input category, which implies that he views certain internal traits that auditors bring to an 
engagement as being the responsibility of the firms, rather than the individual auditor. 
Although the audit process categories in the different frameworks are significantly 
correlated, the size of the relationship is smaller than might be expected.  Despite each 
framework referencing the audit process, the frameworks highlight different areas.  
                                                 
16 Management may have different opinions on the importance of an outcome if the audit opinion 
is something other than unqualified. 
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Specifically, Francis (2011) breaks down the audit process into the audit tests that are 
used and the implementation of those tests, including auditor judgment, risk assessment, 
and audit review.  Neither Knechel et al. (2012) nor the IAASB breaks down the audit 
process into any component parts.   
I also considered using the DeFond and Zhang (2014) audit quality framework 
and the CAQ’s AQIs as audit frameworks and using them to analyze responses; however, 
I deemed each of them as inappropriate for this task.  The DeFond and Zhang (2014) 
framework focuses on the relationship between audit quality and financial statement 
quality due to the shared roles of auditors and management in developing the financial 
statements.  Thus, their framework has three main categories based on the role of 
different stakeholders in the audit process: management (e.g., their demand for high 
quality), auditors (e.g., their incentive to provide high quality), and regulators, who 
influence both management and auditors.  Due to the broader focus on their audit quality 
framework, responses to the survey questions would almost all end up classified in the 
auditor incentive category, which removed nearly all of the variation and would have 
provided few insights into management perceptions of audit quality.   
Similarly, the CAQ’s AQIs have a different focus that made them less useful for 
classification of responses.  The CAQ developed their AQIs in an attempt to identify 
areas in which auditors could provide tangible evidence to client audit committees of the 
quality provided by engagement teams.  While this is a worthy goal, many of the 
responses cannot be classified in this manner.  For instance, management personnel 
valued auditors who exercise strong communication skills during an engagement.  
Another problem with classifying responses using this framework is that the AQIs ignore 
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the role of the final financial statements, as their outcome measures include only PCAOB 
inspection reports and internal audit quality reports.  The CAQ may want to consider 
adding additional outcome measures to their list of AQIs.  
 
Conclusion 
In this paper, I investigate management perceptions of audit quality: both how 
management defines audit quality and how auditors demonstrate quality on their 
engagements.  I also measure management’s perceptions of the value of the CAQ’s AQIs, 
which were released in 2014 as a starting point for greater understanding of indicators of 
audit quality.  I find that, when focusing on defining audit quality, management focuses 
on characteristics of the auditor and the audit process, as well as on the outcomes of the 
audit such as the financial statements and auditor process improvement 
recommendations.  When asked how auditors demonstrate audit quality, however, 
management focuses most heavily on just the auditor and audit process characteristics.  
Similarly, the AQIs that are rated as most important for evaluating audit quality were the 
knowledge and training of audit staff and the audit firm leadership and tone at the top.  
Management rates the outcome of the PCAOB’s inspection reports as the least important 
indicator. 
I contribute to the audit quality literature by providing insight into management 
perceptions of audit quality.  Management is a key stakeholder in the audit process and 
has a significant influence on the auditor hiring and firing decision; thus, their perception 
of audit quality may play a significant role in auditor incentives.  I evaluate their 
perceptions of audit quality through the lens of various audit quality frameworks, 
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including Francis (2011), Knechel et al. (2012), and IAASB (2014).  I also provide some 
of the first feedback on the CAQ’s AQIs by asking management the importance of each 
of the AQIs in evaluating audit quality.  Finally, I identify similarities and differences in 
the audit quality frameworks and identify some areas where there is a disconnect between 
current frameworks and management perceptions in terms of the importance of certain 
audit quality proxies (e.g., outcomes of audits and financial statement quality).  Future 
research may focus on identifying methods of improving either actual audit quality or the 
manner in which auditors convey the message of quality to management in order to 



































































































































Table 2 – CAQ’s Audit Quality Indicators 
  
Audit Quality Indicator Quantitative and Qualitative Information 
  
Firm Leadership & Tone at the Top  
  Communication with audit committee could 
include: 
- Discussion of firm transparency or 
audit quality reports 
- Discussion of firm training programs 
- Discussion of implementation of prior 
inspection report findings 
   
Engagement Team Knowledge, 
Experience, and Workload 
 
  
 Knowledge & experience of key 
engagement team members 
Years on the engagement 
Years of relevant industry experience 
Years with the audit firm 
Years at present level of seniority 
   
 Audit firm training requirements Firm training requirements, including industry-
specific training, with a focus on 
engagement team members 
   
 Trends in engagement hours and 
related timing 
Hours for engagement team members for 
current and prior year 
Changes in planned hours 
Hours by different phases of the audit 
   
 Allocation of resources by 
significant risk area 
Planned allocation of audit hours to significant 
risk areas 
Discussion of how and why certain areas are 
deemed significant risk areas 
Discussion of changes to significant risk areas 
from prior years 
   
 Specialists and national office 
personnel involvement by 
significant risk area 
Number of hours on engagement to be used by 
specialists 
Fees paid to outside specialist 
   
 Key engagement team members’ 
workloads 
Current year projection of hours compared to 
prior year total hours 
Expectation of workload amounts for each 
level 






Table 2 Continued 
  
Audit Quality Indicator Quantitative and Qualitative Information 
  
Monitoring  
   
 Internal quality review findings Nature of findings 
Response to findings 
Remediation planned or enacted 
   
 PCAOB inspection reports Nature of findings 
Response to findings 
Remediation planned or enacted 
Number of engagements inspected 
   
Auditor Reporting  
  
 Reissuance restatements and 
withdrawn auditor’s reports 
Firm-level trends of restatements or withdrawal 
of ICFR reports 
Commonalities in reissuances or withdrawn 
ICFR reports 





Q1: Please describe what “Audit Quality” means to you. 
              
Q2: Please describe way(s) that external auditors have demonstrated high audit 
quality.  Please focus only on interactions that you have had with auditors during a 
time you were employed with the auditor's client. 
              
* The Total column does not equal the sum of the columns for Q1 and Q2 because 
participants may have referenced the category for both questions.  The Total column 
indicates the total number of participants who referenced the category in at least one 
of their responses. 
 
  
Table 3: Summary of Results to Open-Ended Questions for Francis (2011) 
                





Audit Tests 6 4% 8 5% 13 8% 
Engagement 
Team Personnel 




120 70% 91 53% 138 81% 
Accounting 
Firms 
Teams work in 
firms 
0 0% 1 1% 1 1% 
Firms hire, train, 
compensate, and 
develop guidance 
4 2% 4 2% 7 4% 
Reports are 
issued in firm's 
name 





are an industry 
















clients and users 




Table 4: Summary of Results to Open-Ended Questions for Knechel et al. (2013) 
     
  Q1 % Q2 % Total % 
Input 70 41% 63 37% 100 58% 
Audit Process 97 57% 119 70% 147 86% 
Outcomes 74 43% 16 9% 83 49% 
Context 4 2% 0 0% 4 2% 
 
Q1: Please describe what “Audit Quality” means to you. 
              
Q2: Please describe way(s) that external auditors have demonstrated high audit 
quality.  Please focus only on interactions that you have had with auditors during a 
time you were employed with the auditor's client. 
              
* The Total column does not equal the sum of the columns for Q1 and Q2 because 
participants may have referenced the category for both questions.  The Total column 
indicates the total number of participants who referenced the category in at least one 






Table 5: Summary of Results to Open-Ended Questions for IAASB (2014) 
      
  Q1 % Q2 % Total % 
Inputs 82 48% 76 44% 119 70% 
Process 87 51% 81 47% 122 71% 
Output 77 45% 29 17% 93 54% 
Interactions 25 15% 44 26% 58 34% 
Context 8 5% 5 3% 12 7% 
              
Q1: Please describe what “Audit Quality” means to you. 
              
Q2: Please describe way(s) that external auditors have demonstrated high audit 
quality.  Please focus only on interactions that you have had with auditors during a 
time you were employed with the auditor's client. 
              
* The Total column does not equal the sum of the columns for Q1 and Q2 because 
participants may have referenced the category for both questions.  The Total column 
indicates the total number of participants who referenced the category in at least one 






Table 6: Summary of Responses to the CAQ’s Audit Quality Indicators 
 
 Mean Median Mode 
Knowledge & Experience of Key Engagement Team 
Members 
4.48 5 5 
Firm Leadership & Tone at the Top 4.09 4 4 
Allocation of Resources by Significant Risk Areas 4.05 4 4 
Internal Quality Review Findings 3.96 4 4 
Audit Firm Training Requirements 3.90 4 4 
Specialists & National Office Personnel Involvement 
by Significant Risk Area 
3.72 4 4 
Workloads for Key Engagement Team Members 3.64 4 4 
Reissuance Restatements and Withdrawn Auditor's 
Reports 
3.56 4 3 
PCAOB Inspection Findings 3.36 3 3 
Trends in Engagement Hours & Related Timing 3.25 3 3 
 
Survey question: The Center for Audit Quality recently identified several potential 
indicators of audit quality. Please rate how valuable knowledge of the information 
contained in each of the following categories would be for evaluating audit quality. 
 
1 = No value 
2 = Minimal value 
3 = Moderate value 
4 = Large value 









 F1 Audit tests 
 F2 Engagement team personnel 
 F3 Implementation of audit tests by engagement team personnel 
 F4 Engagement teams work in accounting firms 
 F5 Accounting firms hire, train, and compensate auditors, and develop audit 
guidance (testing procedures) 
 F6 Audit reports are issued in name of accounting firms 
 F7 Accounting firms constitute an industry 
 F8 Industry structure affects markets and economic behavior 
 F9 Institutions affect auditing and incentives for quality (e.g. State boards, 
AICPA, FASB, SEC, PCAOB, legal system) 
 F10 Audit outcomes affect clients and users of audited accounting information 
   
Knechel et al. (2013) 
  
 K1 Inputs 
 K2 Audit process 
 K3 Outcomes 
 K4 Context 
   
IAASB (2014) 
   
 I1 Input  
 I2 Process 
 I3 Output 
 I4 Key interactions 
 I5 Contextual factors 








Table 8 – Correlations between Audit Quality Framework Categories for Survey Question #1 
  F1 F2 F3 F5 F6 F10 K1 K2 K3 K4 I1 I2 I3 I4 I5 
F1 1 .000 -.037 -.029 -.021 .101 -.093 .165* -.037 -.029 .009 .186* .020 .011 -.042 
    1.000 .634 .702 .788 .186 .225 .030 .628 .702 .908 .015 .794 .881 .584 
F2 .000 1 -.175* .000 .000 -.016 .710** .188* -.258** .000 .745** .116 -.246** .346** .110 
  1.000   .022 1.000 1.000 .830 .000 .014 .001 1.000 .000 .129 .001 .000 .149 
F3 -.037 -.175* 1 .000 -.063 -.181* -.178* .231** .285** -.089 -.094 .403** .169* -.029 .000 
  .634 .022   1.000 .414 .018 .020 .002 .000 .245 .220 .000 .027 .710 1.000 
F5 -.029 .000 .000 1 -.017 .046 .186* .056 -.056 -.024 .162* .074 .016 .046 -.034 
  .702 1.000 1.000   .827 .551 .014 .464 .464 .757 .034 .337 .833 .551 .657 
F6 -.021 .000 -.063 -.017 1 .109 .021 .094 .015 .343** .114 -.111 .120 .109 -.024 
  .788 1.000 .414 .827   .154 .789 .219 .842 .000 .138 .147 .115 .154 .755 
F10 .101 -.016 -.181* .046 .109 1 -.107 .092 .108 .265** -.063 -.026 .325** .158* -.013 
  .186 .830 .018 .551 .154   .164 .231 .158 .000 .409 .734 .000 .039 .868 
K1 -.093 .710** -.178* .186* .021 -.107 1 .051 -.314** -.049 .773** .004 -.294** .162* .154* 
  .225 .000 .020 .014 .789 .164   .510 .000 .521 .000 .954 .000 .034 .043 
K2 .165* .188* .231** .056 .094 .092 .051 1 -.383** .056 .195* .561** -.210** .292** .136 
  .030 .014 .002 .464 .219 .231 .510   .000 .464 .011 .000 .006 .000 .075 
K3 -.037 -.258** .285** -.056 .015 .108 -.314** -.383** 1 -.056 -.336** -.232** .587** -.025 -.136 
  .628 .001 .000 .464 .842 .158 .000 .000   .464 .000 .002 .000 .743 .075 
K4 -.029 .000 -.089 -.024 .343** .265** -.049 .056 -.056 1 .084 -.004 .094 .155* -.034 
  .702 1.000 .245 .757 .000 .000 .521 .464 .464   .271 .963 .221 .042 .657 
I1 .009 .745** -.094 .162* .114 -.063 .773** .195* -.336** .084 1 .071 -.227** .069 .121 
  .908 .000 .220 .034 .138 .409 .000 .011 .000 .271   .355 .003 .370 .114 
I2 .186* .116 .403** .074 -.111 -.026 .004 .561** -.232** -.004 .071 1 -.290** .007 .105 
  .015 .129 .000 .337 .147 .734 .954 .000 .002 .963 .355   .000 .928 .169 
I3 .020 -.246** .169* .016 .120 .325** -.294** -.210** .587** .094 -.227** -.290** 1 -.006 -.199** 
  .794 .001 .027 .833 .115 .000 .000 .006 .000 .221 .003 .000   .934 .009 
I4 .011 .346** -.029 .046 .109 .158* .162* .292** -.025 .155* .069 .007 -.006 1 .066 
  .881 .000 .710 .551 .154 .039 .034 .000 .743 .042 .370 .928 .934   .393 
I5 -.042 .110 .000 -.034 -.024 -.013 .154* .136 -.136 -.034 .121 .105 -.199** .066 1 








Table 9 – Correlations between Audit Quality Framework Categories for Survey Question #2 
  F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F10 K1 K2 K3 I1 I2 I3 I4 I5 
F1 1 -.176* .037 -.017 -.034 .092 -.111 .147 .024 -.030 .179* .122 -.129 -.038 
   .021 .627 .826 .657 .229 .149 .054 .752 .699 .019 .112 .090 .619 
F2 -.176* 1 .050 -.101 .117 -.176* .528** .198** .036 .555** .016 -.077 .335** .132 
 .021   .515 .189 .125 .021 .000 .009 .642 .000 .833 .318 .000 .085 
F3 .037 .050 1 -.083 .065 -.066 .071 .396** .175* .186* .636** -.052 .032 .021 
 .627 .515   .279 .398 .390 .354 .000 .022 .015 .000 .495 .674 .789 
F4 -.017 -.101 -.083 1 -.012 -.028 -.058 .051 -.024 -.068 .081 -.034 -.045 -.013 
 .826 .189 .279   .878 .718 .449 .506 .750 .375 .291 .654 .559 .863 
F5 -.034 .117 .065 -.012 1 -.056 .043 -.064 -.049 .096 .086 -.069 .086 -.027 
 .657 .125 .398 .878   .466 .577 .403 .520 .212 .260 .365 .260 .728 
F10 .092 -.176* -.066 -.028 -.056 1 -.088 .124 .071 -.140 -.052 .466** -.088 .153* 
 .229 .021 .390 .718 .466   .253 .104 .354 .067 .502 .000 .251 .045 
K1 -.111 .528** .071 -.058 .043 -.088 1 -.041 .006 .660** -.040 -.052 .024 .084 
 .149 .000 .354 .449 .577 .253   .589 .940 .000 .599 .496 .750 .274 
K2 .147 .198** .396** .051 -.064 .124 -.041 1 -.133 .061 .453** .132 .189* .041 
 .054 .009 .000 .506 .403 .104 .589   .082 .424 .000 .083 .013 .598 
K3 .024 .036 .175* -.024 -.049 .071 .006 -.133 1 -.003 .019 .337** .087 -.055 
 .752 .642 .022 .750 .520 .354 .940 .082   .971 .808 .000 .254 .470 
I1 -.030 .555** .186* -.068 .096 -.140 .660** .061 -.003 1 .028 -.088 -.146 .125 
 .699 .000 .015 .375 .212 .067 .000 .424 .971   .712 .251 .056 .103 
I2 .179* .016 .636** .081 .086 -.052 -.040 .453** .019 .028 1 -.176* -.099 -.025 
 .019 .833 .000 .291 .260 .502 .599 .000 .808 .712   .021 .195 .749 
I3 .122 -.077 -.052 -.034 -.069 .466** -.052 .132 .337** -.088 -.176* 1 -.050 -.078 
 .112 .318 .495 .654 .365 .000 .496 .083 .000 .251 .021   .511 .310 
I4 -.129 .335** .032 -.045 .086 -.088 .024 .189* .087 -.146 -.099 -.050 1 .057 
 .090 .000 .674 .559 .260 .251 .750 .013 .254 .056 .195 .511   .456 
I5 -.038 .132 .021 -.013 -.027 .153* .084 .041 -.055 .125 -.025 -.078 .057 1 








Category 1 2 3 4 5 6 
K1 0.902  0.110  (0.080) (0.091) (0.130) (0.100) 
F2 0.900  0.014  (0.093) 0.015  0.081  0.123  
I1 0.864  (0.023) 0.053  (0.100) (0.083) (0.170) 
I4 0.377  (0.145) 0.176  0.269  0.291  0.351  
I2 (0.051) (0.827) (0.059) (0.202) 0.089  (0.057) 
F3 (0.106) (0.755) (0.097) 0.460  (0.353) (0.038) 
K2 0.072  (0.732) 0.186  (0.212) 0.240  0.083  
K4 (0.082) (0.010) 0.805  (0.077) 0.048  (0.014) 
F6 (0.005) (0.008) 0.786  0.004  (0.151) (0.041) 
K3 (0.111) 0.080  (0.137) 0.847  (0.074) 0.006  
I3 (0.079) 0.101  0.090  0.786  0.156  (0.156) 
F1 (0.086) (0.124) (0.261) (0.093) 0.718  (0.094) 
F10 (0.008) 0.091  0.278  0.230  0.638  (0.023) 
F5 0.252  (0.152) 0.038  0.009  0.017  (0.761) 










Category 1 2 3 4 5 6 
I1 0.914 0.070 (0.043) (0.212) 0.039 (0.023) 
K1 0.878 (0.063) 0.005 (0.048) 0.003 0.019 
F2 0.682 0.088 (0.009) 0.433 0.080 (0.057) 
I2 (0.033) 0.870 (0.190) (0.148) (0.055) 0.035 
F3 0.110 0.810 (0.036) (0.020) (0.194) (0.126) 
K2 (0.015) 0.741 0.181 0.244 0.278 0.163 
I3 0.006 (0.057) 0.848 (0.001) (0.222) 0.044 
F10 (0.108) (0.022) 0.747 (0.108) 0.279 (0.003) 
I4 (0.150) 0.087 0.036 0.910 0.026 (0.111) 
F1 (0.105) 0.253 0.197 (0.430) 0.055 (0.095) 
K3 0.106 0.055 0.456 0.146 (0.718) (0.014) 
I5 0.157 (0.008) 0.152 0.089 0.640 (0.029) 





EXAMINING THE IMPACT OF INDUSTRY NORMS ON 
MANAGEMENT PERCEPTIONS OF AUDIT QUALITY 
UNDER IMPRECISE ACCOUNTING GUIDANCE
 
Introduction 
An auditor's work on any particular engagement will be evaluated by several 
different groups.  Each of these groups may have their own definition of audit quality, 
and these definitions are unlikely to be identical.  For example, an auditor tasked with 
determining the appropriateness of a client’s accounting position may consider how the 
decision would be perceived by members of management and the audit committee, the 
Public Company Oversight Board (PCAOB), and/or jurors in a potential lawsuit.    In this 
scenario, auditors have competing incentives because losing clients over accounting 
disagreements, receiving poor inspection reports, or incurring lawsuits and/or having 
restatements can each negatively impact an auditor’s professional career.  Thus, 
understanding how different groups evaluate auditor decisions improves our 
understanding of auditor motivations and incentives.  I begin to explore this area by 
investigating how auditors’ use of industry norms17 impacts management18 perceptions of 
                                                 
17 Specifically, financial reporting norms. 




audit quality when accounting standards are imprecise.   
Understanding how auditor decisions impact management perceptions of audit 
quality is important due to the integral role that management fills in both the day-to-day 
function of an engagement19 and the year-to-year decision to hire and fire an auditor.    
Bennett and Hatfield (2013) show that day-to-day engagement decisions can be 
influenced by perceptions of the auditor-management relationship; therefore, auditors 
who develop a good working relationship with management are likely to be able to 
operate the engagement more effectively and efficiently.  Additionally, despite the 
requirement in Sarbanes-Oxley that audit committees are to be in charge of hiring and 
firing auditors, many auditors still perceive management to be the “driving force behind 
auditor appointments and terminations” (Cohen et al. 2010, 752).  Thus, auditors are 
incentivized to remain aware of how their decisions on an audit engagement are 
perceived by management.   
An auditor’s use of industry norms and the level of precision in the accounting 
standards are two intertwined factors that may impact management perceptions of audit 
quality.  Business is too complex for every possible transaction to be explicitly specified, 
so accounting standards often have some degree of imprecision in order to allow them to 
be generalized across a wider range of circumstances.  At times, auditors and 
management disagree about how best to apply imprecise accounting guidance to specific 
transactions.  As precision decreases, auditors are less likely to be able to take a strong 
                                                 
at least a portion of the financial reporting process and interaction with the external audit team.  Specific 
job titles may include, but are not limited to, CEO, CFO, VP of Finance, Director of Financial Reporting, 
Controller, and Accounting Manager. 
19 A member of management is typically responsible for coordinating the engagement with the 
audit team.  This responsibility may include tasks such as preparing and/or collecting requested 
documentation, introducing members of the audit team to key company personnel, and resolving issues that 




position based solely on available guidance.  When auditors have a reduced ability to use 
professional standards as a basis for their recommendations, they may instead choose to 
base their decision on some alternative source of credibility.  An auditor’s choice of 
alternative source can provide a signal of quality (or lack thereof) to management.  One 
alternative source that may be available to auditors is the presence of an industry norm, 
and its use as a justification method for a decision can provide additional clarity and 
credibility when the accounting standards are imprecise.  
Although using industry norms can be helpful in determining appropriate 
accounting treatment for transactions, auditors should be cautious about using industry 
norms as a default position.  An auditor’s use of professional judgment should always 
dictate when an industry norm is, or is not, appropriate for an individual client.  For 
example, in 2005 approximately 270 companies, mostly in the retail and restaurant chain 
industry, restated their financial statements due to similarly inappropriate lease 
accounting (Rapoport 2005).  The restatements began when CKE Industries discovered 
an error and restated their financial statements, which caused other companies in the 
industry to examine their lease accounting practices more closely.  Ultimately the SEC 
issued a letter clarifying the appropriate accounting treatment, which led to a flurry of 
restatements.  Hyatt and Reed (2007) conclude that most of these companies were 
operating in good faith; however, the lack of attention given to the lease accounting 
requirements resulted in an unwanted restatement for many companies.  Although any of 
these restating companies could have performed the same review of their financial 
policies that CKE Industries performed, the presence of an established industry norm, and 




misinterpretation of the accounting standard.   
Unfortunately, auditors may have significant incentives to use industry norms as a 
default response when accounting standards are imprecise (referred to as herding 
behavior).  Kadous and Mercer (2012) find that, when accounting standards are 
imprecise, jurors view audit quality as being higher and are less likely to find auditors 
negligent when auditors’ decisions are consistent with industry norms.  This perception 
of higher audit quality exists even when the actual quality of the auditor’s decision is 
lower.  The threat of litigation is very real to accounting firms, and if the safe harbor 
protections identified by Kadous and Mercer (2012) are strong enough, auditors may 
view industry norms as pseudo-authoritative guidance and use them as a substitute for 
their own professional judgment.  
On the other hand, the existing litigation incentives to default to industry norms, 
the percentage of total audits that result in a trial before a jury is so low that jurors are the 
group that is least likely to evaluate an auditor’s work (Palmrose 1988).  Therefore, the 
threat of litigation may provide an insufficient incentive for auditors to actively engage in 
herding behavior because jurors are not the only group that evaluates auditor decisions.  
In order to fully understand the incentives for auditors’ use of industry norms, we must 
also understand how other groups evaluate their use.  As previously discussed, auditors 
are likely to be motivated by management’s perceptions.  If management perceives an 
auditor’s use of industry norms in a manner similar to that of jurors, then auditors have an 
increased incentive to default to the use of industry norms, especially when accounting 
standards are imprecise.  If, however, management evaluates audit work based on other 




fully mitigated.   
Understanding the impact of industry norms on management perceptions of audit 
quality is an important current issue in the auditing and accounting community.  The 
United States continues to move towards a more principles-based accounting framework, 
which is likely to decrease the level of precision in the accounting standards and may 
subsequently lead to increased incentives for auditors to use industry norms as a 
substitute for professional judgment. If these incentives are strong enough, one of the 
main advantages of a principles-based framework – the flexibility to use appropriate 
professional judgment in the application of the standard – may be eliminated.   On the 
other hand, the PCAOB is currently determining whether to officially incorporate an 
auditor’s consideration of industry norms when evaluating accounting estimates and fair 
value measurements (PCAOB 2014).  This research will help to inform the debate about 
the appropriate use for industry norms. 
I use the Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM) as developed by Petty and 
Cacioppo (1986) to inform my predictions about how management will evaluate an 
auditor’s use of industry norms.   The ELM states that people process persuasive 
communications through either a central or a peripheral route.  Processing through the 
central route is more systematic and effortful; thus, it requires a higher level of ability and 
motivation. If motivation and/or ability are lacking, processing will occur through the 
peripheral route, which is characterized by the use of heuristics and is subject to a greater 
influence of bias.  Management is likely to be both sufficiently motivated have the 
requisite ability to engage in systematic processing when evaluating auditor decisions.  




auditor’s use of industry norms as a justification method.  Rather, I expect that 
management evaluations of audit quality will be based on an evaluation of the underlying 
accounting attributes20 of auditor decisions.  I do expect that decreasing the precision in 
the standards will increase management’s reliance on the auditor’s justification method, 
but not to the extent that its effect will override the impact of the underlying accounting 
attributes. 
In order to test my research question, I perform an experiment that utilizes an 
audit adjustment setting.  I manipulate three variables: Justification Method (Professional 
judgment, Industry norms), Precision (Less, More), and Accounting Attributes 
(Conservative, Aggressive).  Participants consist of current and former members of 
management (i.e., controllers, financial directors, CFOs, etc.).  All participants have 
professional experience that includes oversight of at least a portion of the financial 
reporting process and/or interaction with external auditors.  Participants are asked to 
assume the role of a controller in a fictional company that operates under either United 
States Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (U.S. GAAP) or International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS).  Each participant evaluates proposed audit adjustments 
related to the allowance for doubtful accounts and the classification of leases.  
Participants rate their perception of audit quality and the likelihood of recording the 
adjustment.   
I find evidence that management considers industry norms to be a higher quality 
                                                 
20 I define underlying accounting attributes as the core features of a transaction that determine how 
it should be recorded in the financial statements.  For example, the underlying attributes of a lease 





justification method than professional judgment; however, when accounting standards are 
more precise, management’s evaluation of audit quality is based on underlying 
accounting attributes rather than on the justification method used.  I also find that as 
precision in the accounting standards decreases, management views audit quality as being 
higher when an auditor justifies a decision using industry norms.  Therefore, when 
precision is low, auditors are incentivized to engage in herding behavior.   
This study contributes to the accounting literature by providing important insight 
into the impact of the United States’ convergence with international standards.  I 
demonstrate that, as accounting standards become less precise, auditors may be 
incentivized to use industry norms as a substitute for the guidance that would previously 
have been included in the accounting standard.  Lawmakers, regulators, and standard 
setters need to be aware of this incentive in order to consider the potential impact on audit 
quality of allowing an industry to informally develop accounting guidance.  Audit quality 
may increase if appropriate industry norms are developed and used consistently; 
conversely, audit quality may decrease if auditors attempt to inappropriately fit a 
transaction to a norm rather than using professional judgment to determine a better 
treatment.   
The remainder of this paper is as follows.  In the next section I review the 
background literature and develop the hypotheses.  I then describe the research design, 
followed by a discussion of the results of my analysis and  concluding remarks, including 






Background and Hypothesis Development 
Arnold Schilder, chairman of the International Auditing and Assurance Standards 
Board (IAASB), said “Different stakeholders are likely to have different views about 
what audit quality is and how it can be enhanced” (IAASB 2011, p. 2).  One stakeholder 
in the audit process is client management, and their perceptions of auditors can and do 
have a real impact on auditor behavior.  For example, Bennett and Hatfield (2012) find 
that auditors who are socially mismatched with client management are more likely to 
reduce the amount of audit evidence collected and/or are more likely to use vague or 
inappropriate documentation.21  Also, Wang and Tuttle (2009) find evidence suggesting 
that auditors who operate under a mandatory client rotation setting change their 
negotiation strategies during the final year of the audit relationship when the auditor no 
longer needs to worry about client retention.     
Despite the importance of understanding the impact that management perceptions 
have on audit quality, very little research has investigated the factors that influence these 
perceptions.  Carcello et al. (1992) presented controllers with a list of potential audit 
quality indicators and found the following factors to be rated as the most important 
indicators of audit quality: responsiveness to client needs, compliance with general audit 
standards, CPA firm executive involvement, maintenance of a skeptical attitude, and 
degree of individual responsibility.  Although these factors were perceived to be most 
important, several arguably relate more to service quality than audit quality.  
Additionally, while these factors may be helpful for creating and maintaining a certain 
                                                 
21 Vague and inappropriate documentation can indirectly affect audit quality by impairing an audit 
reviewer’s ability to fully understand the procedures performed and the evidence collected, which in turn 




type of culture in audit firms, they are less insightful for understanding how management 
perceives audit quality related to specific auditor decisions.  Understanding how specific 
audit decisions impact management perceptions is important for understanding auditor 
incentives and is an underexplored area of accounting research  
On the other hand, accounting litigation research has investigated how specific 
auditor decisions impact perceptions of audit quality for juror and judge participants.  
Lowe et al. (2002) find that jurors attribute less blame to auditors when they follow the 
recommendations of a firm decision aid, and Kadous and Mercer (2012) find that jurors 
perceive audit quality to be higher when auditors’ decisions are consistent with an 
industry norm.   This research would suggest that, when available, auditors are 
incentivized to use firm decision aids and industry norms in order to reduce litigation 
risk.  No prior accounting literature has investigated the impact of these types of auditor 
decisions on management perceptions of audit quality.  If management perceptions of 
audit quality are affected in a manner similar to that of jurors, then auditor incentives for 
these behaviors are magnified.  Alternatively, if management perceives these decisions 
differently than jurors, then auditor incentives for their use may be reduced.  In order to 
more fully understand the incentives faced by auditors, we must also understand the 




                                                 
22 Jurors and management do not constitute the whole population of groups that evaluate audit 
quality.  A complete understanding of auditor incentives would include any additional evaluator groups, 




The Elaboration Likelihood Model 
The ELM, as developed by Petty and Cacioppo (1986), provides a framework for 
understanding how management may evaluate auditor decisions.  The ELM suggests that 
persuasive messages23 are evaluated along either a central route or a peripheral route.  
The central route is used for systematic processing, which is more thoughtful and 
effortful, while the peripheral route is characterized by heuristic processing, and relies 
more on external cues and mental shortcuts.  In order to exert the extra effort required to 
engage in systematic processing, individuals must have both motivation and ability 
(collectively termed elaboration).  If either of these characteristics is missing, individuals 
are more likely to use the less effortful heuristic processing.  Using heuristic processing 
can lead to lower quality decisions; thus, it is important to determine if management has 
both the motivation and the ability to engage in systematic processing when evaluating 
auditor decisions. See Figure 4. 
 
Motivation 
Prior research in psychology suggests that management is likely to have sufficient 
motivation to engage in systematic processing.  Petty et al. (1995) find that the most 
common determinant of motivation is the personal relevance of the message.  As 
relevance increases, individuals are more likely to process a message systematically 
(Chaiken 1980; Petty, Cacioppo, & Goldman 1981).  Auditor decisions should have a 
strong personal relevance for management for at least a few reasons.  Auditors and 
                                                 
23 In this experiment, I consider the persuasive message to be some signal of audit quality that the 
auditor desires to send to management.  To operationalize the persuasive message, I utilize an audit 




management have been described as co-creators of the financial statements (Salterio 
2012; see also Antle & Nalebuff 1991), and most auditor-management interactions occur 
within this context.  Despite this shared role, management has ultimate responsibility 
over the preparation of the financial statements.  Sarbanes-Oxley also requires both the 
CEO and CFO of publicly traded companies to certify their financial statements (SOX 
2002).  Additionally, portions of management compensation, such as bonuses and stock 
options, are often dependent on the annual financial outcomes of a company.  Thus, I 
expect management to have sufficient motivation to evaluate auditor decisions 
systematically and that this motivation level is independent of auditor decisions.   
 
Ability 
Prior research suggests that management should usually, but may not always, 
have the appropriate level of ability24 to systematically process decisions.  Based on a 
review of prior literature, I separate the determinants of ability into three general 
categories.  Internal characteristics are those that relate to the individual tasked with 
processing a message.  Examples of internal characteristics include technical ability 
and/or knowledge (Wood et al. 1985) and cognitive depletion (Sanbonmatsu & Kardes 
1988).  Environmental characteristics relate to conditions that are external to the 
individual, and include distraction (Festinger & Maccoby 1964) and level of 
relaxation/comfort (Petty et al. 1983).  Message characteristics relate to the persuasive 
message, and include the incomprehensibility/ambiguity (Ratneshwar & Chaiken 1991), 
                                                 
24 In this paper, the term “ability” is used in the technical context of the ELM, and not in the more 





complexity (Cacioppo & Petty 1989), and delivery speed (Moore et al. 1986) of the 
message.      
Although factors in each of these categories may affect management’s ability to 
process systematically, auditors are unlikely to have much of an influence on the internal 
or environmental characteristics.  The internal characteristic that likely has the largest 
impact on ability is management’s level of technical knowledge and experience.  
Technical knowledge and experience is developed primarily through management’s 
education and professional experiences, and every company will require some baseline 
requirement for an individual to even be considered for a management position.  This 
baseline level is assumed to be high enough to understand the relevant accounting and 
financial reporting issues that a company faces; thus, members of management are 
assumed to have appropriate internal characteristics.  Environmental characteristics, such 
as distraction or level of relaxation, are most likely influenced by professional 
relationships, work responsibilities, and other factors that originate from the work 
environment.  Although the auditor may occasionally have some influence over 
environmental characteristics by strategically choosing the time and manner that they 
present management with evaluation opportunities, this influence is likely to be less 
important than other factors.   
Auditors may be able to exert some influence over the message characteristics 
because much of the audit information that management evaluates is delivered or 
provided by the audit team.  Examples of message characteristics that have been studied 




communication (Bennett & Hatfield 2012)25 and the use of a reciprocity-based 
negotiation strategy when presenting a client with audit adjustments (Sanchez et al. 
2007).  An auditor’s use of industry norms may also affect the message characteristics of 
a persuasive message by strengthening the credibility of that message and providing a 
basis of comparability with peer companies.  Additionally, the use of industry norms can 
be a protection against potential future litigation, as Kadous and Mercer (2012) show that 
jurors view audit quality as being higher when auditors justify a decision using an 
industry norm.   
Despite the potential incentives to use industry norms as a default choice on all 
engagements, auditors are expected to use their professional judgment at all stages of an 
audit (AICPA 1972).  Although using an industry norm as an additional piece of evidence 
would not be inappropriate, an auditor is expected to base a decision about the 
appropriateness of an accounting transaction primarily on the underlying accounting 
attributes of the transaction.  Thus, when there is sufficient accounting information 
available, an industry norm should provide little to no additional information in 
determining the appropriate accounting treatment for a transaction.  Rather, the use of an 
industry norm as a primary evaluative tool would likely indicate the use of some heuristic 
processing, and members of management have been shown to be susceptible to heuristic 
processing under certain circumstances (Burton et al. 2012).  Thus, management may 
view an auditor's use of industry norms in a manner similar to that of jurors, which would 
                                                 
25 This study does not investigate how these different communication methods impact 
management perceptions or actions, but it does find that auditors gather more evidence using email 
communication when they perceive a social mismatch with management.  Thus, this study provides 




increase the incentive for auditors to use industry norms as pseudo-authoritative guidance 
and/or as a substitute for professional judgment. 
My first hypothesis is set up as a research design construct to show that 
management views industry norms as a more credible justification method than an 
auditor’s professional judgment alone.   Absent additional information,26 management 
could rationally expect that a decision justified using an industry norm is more credible 
than one justified using professional judgment, as the industry norm would have the 
additional implicit approval of a larger number of qualified individuals.  H1 is stated as 
follows: 
 H1:     Management will perceive industry norms as a more credible justification 
method than an auditor’s professional judgment when the justification method is 
the only evaluative information that they are provided.  
My second hypothesis focuses on decision evaluations that are more consistent 
with realistic auditor-client relationships.  Although I expect industry norms to be rated 
more positively when evaluated independently of additional accounting information, 
management would rarely, if ever, evaluate an audit decision under these 
conditions.  Rather, management would either already have, or would request of the 
auditors, the additional information needed to fully understand an auditor’s decision.  
Thus, in practical situations, I expect that management will have both the appropriate 
                                                 
26 In the context of the ELM, the lack of information could be interpreted in two ways.  First, the 
auditor may be processing along the heuristic path because the lack of provided information prevents 
management from having the ability to process systematically.  Alternatively, management may be 
processing systematically and evaluating the only piece of available information in the most rational 
manner possible.  As this hypothesis is for research design purposes only, and the type of processing used 
in this scenario is not central to the research question, I do not predict or make an attempt to measure which 




motivation and ability to engage in systematic processing, and the auditor's choice of 
justification method will subsequently have no noticeable impact on management's 
evaluation of audit quality.  Instead, when evaluating an auditor’s decision, 
management’s evaluation will be based on the quality of the auditor’s interpretation of 
the underlying accounting attributes.  The industry norm would be more of a heuristic 
device, and management’s choice to place lower reliance in an industry norm would be 
consistent with prior research that finds that auditors are less likely to be affected by 
heuristics and biases as they perform more realistic tasks (Smith & Kida 1991).  I expect 
that members of management, who are likely to have related backgrounds and abilities to 
auditors, would behave similarly by evaluating auditors based on the quality of their 
interpretation of a transaction’s underlying attributes.  Thus, my next two hypotheses are 
stated as follows: 
 H2a:  When management evaluates an audit decision, management 
perceptions of audit quality will be influenced by the underlying accounting 
attributes. 
 H2b:  When management evaluates an audit decision, management 
perceptions of audit quality will not be influenced by the auditor’s 
justification method. 
As discussed previously, ambiguity is another message characteristic that may 
impact an individual’s ability to process systematically.  The lack of precision in 
accounting standards may have a similar impact as ambiguity when management 
evaluates an auditor decision.  Some imprecision has always been present in accounting 




contingencies, states that loss contingencies are evaluated by determining whether a loss 
is “probable” and can be “reasonably estimated.”  Neither of these criteria provides 
concrete guidance; rather, each requires some level of professional judgment.  
Understanding the impact of imprecision in accounting standards is an especially 
important topic in the current accounting environment due to the United States’ 
convergence with international accounting standards.  Rules-based standards are 
generally considered to contain more bright-line tests and concrete implementation 
guidance, whereas principles-based standards rely more on overarching principles 
(Schipper 2003).  Thus, the structure of principles-based standards is typically less 
precise than rules-based standards.   
Differences in an accounting framework can change management behaviors, as 
Jamal and Tan (2010) show that managers are more likely to make aggressive decisions 
when their company operates under a principles-based standard and their auditors have a 
rules-based mindset.  I expect that decreased precision in the standards increases 
management’s use of heuristic processing when evaluating auditor decisions.  The 
increase in heuristic processing would likewise increase management’s reliance on the 
auditor’s justification method as an evaluative tool.  Thus, as precision in the accounting 
standards decreases, the external credibility (lack of external credibility) that is invoked 
by the auditor’s use of industry norms (professional judgment) is likely to increase 
(decrease) management’s perception of audit quality.  My third hypothesis is stated as 
follows: 
 H3:  In situations of lower precision, management will rate audit quality 




(professional judgment) as compared to situations of higher precision. 
 
Research Design 
Participants   
Participants were recruited using the accounting alumni database of a large 
research university in the western United States.  The initial email list contained 3,678 
unique alumni, although potential candidates were invited to forward the request to 
acquaintances with similar educational and/or professional backgrounds.  From that 
group, 125 email requests were returned as undeliverable.  Initially, 373 (10%) potential 
candidates responded to the request for participation by opening the link to the 
experimental materials.27  Once participants opened the link, they were asked a series of 
three screening questions designed to ensure they had a professional background that 
included management experience and were not currently employed as an external auditor.  
Of the 373 responses, 82 were eliminated based on their professional background,28 
leaving 291 participants that had the appropriate professional background.  Of these 291, 
another 99 exited the instrument prior to completing the manipulation checks and were 
removed from the analysis, leaving 192 participant responses to evaluate.  Participants 
also answered a range of demographic questions, including gender, age, educational 
background, audit experience, and professional experience.  There were no significant 
                                                 
27 The experimental materials were administered through Qualtrics. 
28 Of the 82 who were eliminated based on their professional background, 46 (56%) were currently 
employed in public accounting and 57 (70%) lacked professional interaction with external auditors.  
Additionally, instead of opening the instrument link and being screened out of participation, some 
respondents responded by email with a reason why they were declining to participate.  The most common 
reason provided was a professional background in an area outside of audit or accounting (i.e., lawyer, tax 




differences between the participants in the cells for any of the demographic 
characteristics. See Table 12 for participant demographics. 
 
Experimental Setting 
 One common area of auditor interaction with management is the adjustment 
process.  As auditors perform their testwork, they are likely to encounter transactions that 
they believe are accounted for improperly.  These transactions may result from clear-cut 
mistakes (e.g., invoices entered at an incorrect amount), differences in opinion about 
estimates (e.g., the client’s method for calculating the allowance for doubtful accounts), 
or disagreements about the appropriate interpretation of imprecise accounting standards 
(e.g., the classification of an investment as Level 2 or Level 3).  The use of the 
adjustment process as an experimental setting is most commonly used in the negotiation 
literature (see Salterio 2012 for a review of this stream of literature).  The negotiation 
process begins with an auditor’s discovery of the possible need for an adjustment to the 
financial statement and concludes with one of the following actions: 1) management 
declines to record the adjustment and the auditor determines that this decision will not 
have a material impact on the financial statements,29 2) management agrees to record the 
transaction, 3) management and the auditor find a compromise solution that satisfies both 
parties,30 or 4) management and the auditor are unable to agree on an acceptable solution 
                                                 
29 All proposed audit adjustments that management declines to record are reported to the audit 
committee, typically as part of the management letter.  These passed audit adjustments are also included in 
the management representation letter. 
30 Compromises in this process often involve management agreeing to record a lesser amount that, 
in the opinion of the auditor, reduces the misstatement to an acceptable level.  For instance, management 
may be willing to record all known misstatements from a sample of revenue transactions but choose not to 





and the audit committee becomes involved.31   
The adjustment process provides an ideal setting to test my research question for 
several reasons.  It utilizes a situation that is common to the auditor-management 
relationship and introduces a persuasive message (i.e., the proposed adjustment) for 
management to evaluate.  Additionally, when auditors present an adjustment, they will 
likely have to provide greater than normal transparency into the audit process in an 
attempt to convince management the adjustment is necessary.  This increased 
transparency provides additional data points for management to use in their evaluation.  
Finally, the adjustment process creates a situation in which auditors and management are, 
at least initially, in a conflicting position, which can help to generate a level of motivation 
for participants that is sufficient for systematic processing. 
 
Task  
 There are two related scenarios in the experimental task.  In both scenarios 
participants imagine themselves in the role of a controller for their company and are 
asked to evaluate a proposed adjustment made by the company’s auditors. 
 
Scenario 1 
 Scenario 1 of the experimental task is designed to test H1 by measuring a baseline 
perception of the use of industry norms as a justification method.  Participants are told 
that the auditor has proposed an audit adjustment over the allowance for doubtful 
accounts.  Other than a generic overview, participants are not provided with the details 
                                                 
31 In rare circumstances, the auditor and client representatives may not be able to reach an 




related to the company’s calculation for the allowance, nor do the auditors provide any 
explanation for their proposed adjustment beyond a reliance on one of the justification 
methods (professional judgment or industry norms). See the Appendix for the 
manipulations. 
Independent variables. I employ a 2x1 between subjects design.  My between 
subjects variable is Justification Method (Professional judgment, Industry norms).   
Dependent variable.  Participants are asked to rate the likelihood that the 
auditor’s proposed adjustment is correct.   
 
Scenario 2  
Following the completion of Scenario 1, participants are provided with a short 
training on lease classification that is tailored to either ASC 840 (for rules-based 
participants) or International Accounting Standard (IAS) 17 (for principles-based 
participants).  The primary distinction between ASC 840 and IAS 17 relates to the 
specificity of the criteria for determining a capital lease.32  ASC 840 lists four criteria 
that, should any be met, automatically require a lease to be classified as an operating 
lease.  IAS 17 states instead that a lease must be classified as a capital lease if the lease 
substantially transfers the risks and rewards of ownership to the lessee.  IAS 17 provides 
examples of criteria that may indicate this transfer has occurred,33 but none of these 
criteria are an automatic trigger for a capital lease classification.  Similar to Agoglia et al. 
                                                 
32 In IAS 17 this type of lease is referred to as a finance lease rather than a capital lease.  In the 
experimental materials I use the term “finance lease” for participants in the principles-based setting.  For 
purposes of clarity, I use the term “capital lease” throughout this paper to refer to nonoperating leases under 
both ASC 840 and IAS 17. 




(2011), I focus on criteria related to the lease term.  Under ASC 840 (IAS 17), any lease 
with a term that is greater than 75% (for the major part) of the useful life of the asset 
must (may need to) be classified as a capital lease.  The differences between these 
frameworks should cause the principles-based standard to be perceived as being less 
precise than the rules-based standard.  See the Appendix for the manipulations. 
 Participants are then instructed that they are acting in the role of controller for 
their company, which manufactures medical devices such as X-rays and MRI scanners.  
The company is publicly traded on either the New York or London Stock Exchange.  The 
company is in the middle of their annual audit and the audit manager is meeting with the 
controller to provide an update.  As part of the update, the auditor presents the controller 
with three proposed adjustments.  Participants are told that for the first two adjustments, 
they agree with one and disagree with the other.  These first two adjustments are included 
to reinforce the perspective that proposed audit adjustments may be either correct or 
incorrect.   
 Following the introduction of the first two adjustments, participants are provided 
with the details of significant operating leases that the company entered into during the 
year.  The leases are structured to be for 62% of the useful life, but contain a renewal 
option that is either 10% or 30% of the current market rental value at the time of renewal.  
The renewal options, if exercised, would increase the lease term to 76% of the useful life.  
The auditor disagrees with the company’s classification and is proposing an adjustment to 
classify the leases as capital leases.  The auditor provides several reasons why the 




judgment or industry norms.34  See the Appendix for the manipulations. 
 Finally, participants are asked to respond to the dependent variable questions, as 
well as questions designed to test the effectiveness of the manipulations and to gather 
demographic information.  At the conclusion of the instrument, participants are given an 
option to receive either a $10 Amazon.com gift card or to have a donation of $10 made 
on their behalf to one of several charitable organizations.35  
Independent variables.  Scenario 2 uses a 2 x 2 x 2 between subjects design.  
The variables are Justification Method (Professional judgment, Industry norms), 
Precision (More, Less) and Accounting Attributes (Conservative, Aggressive).  
Participants are randomly assigned to one of the eight cell conditions. 
Dependent variables.  I collect responses for several dependent variables that 
measure the impact of the manipulations on participants’ perception of the auditors and 
audit quality.  Participants are asked to rate their level of agreement with the auditor’s 
decision to require the change in lease classification, their level of satisfaction with the 
audit service provided, and their recommendation for engaging the same audit firm for 
future audit engagements.  Additionally, I ask them to determine whether or not they are 
likely to record the adjustment (Yes/No).  Also, since participants may assess an 
individual auditor and the audit firm differently, I ask for a recommendation for engaging 
the same audit firm if there was a guarantee that a new manager would be assigned to the 
                                                 
34 The auditors in Scenario 1 and 2 use the same justification method for all participants. 
35 Of the 192 participants analyzed, 10 (5%) ended participation at some point between completing 
the manipulation checks and selecting a form of payment.  Another 6 (3%) chose not to receive a payment 
or make a donation.  An equal number of participants [88 (46%)] selected the Amazon gift card and the 
donation option.  In an attempt to increase participation, one of the charitable organizations listed was the 
general business school scholarship fund of the participant’s alma mater.  Among the participants who 
chose to make a donation, 70% chose to donate to the scholarship fund and the remaining 30% chose 1 of 








 Although the experimental materials are similar to Agoglia et al. (2011), pilot 
testing was conducted to ensure the new manipulations were well understood and 
effective.  The initial round of pilot testing involved reviewing the materials with 
individuals in the auditing and accounting industry: one partner at an international 
accounting firm who has extensive experience in classifying leases, one international 
controller for a private company, and one manager at a local CPA firm.  These 
individuals reviewed the experimental materials to ensure the setting was realistic, the 
terminology was not company- or firm-specific, and none of the materials was 
unnecessarily dense or difficult to understand.  Additionally, to ensure my Accounting 
Attributes manipulation was effective, I asked several partners of large, international 
accounting firms what discount would indicate that a renewal option is a bargain.  The 
responses ranged from 15-25%; thus my manipulations of 10% and 30% appear to be 
appropriate. 
 The second pilot group consisted of senior-level college students who were 
enrolled in an auditing class.  Although this group had limited practical experience in 
auditing and accounting, their technical knowledge was advanced enough to allow them 
to understand the accounting issues in the two scenarios.  This group assisted in testing 
the effectiveness of the manipulations of the materials. 




to verify the effectiveness of the manipulations after several changes were made based on 
prior pilot testing.  Results from all pilot tests indicated that the materials were 
understandable to those in the target demographic, and the manipulations appeared to be 
effective. 
 
Manipulation Check Results 
 I included several manipulation checks within the postexperimental questions.  I 
asked the participants what accounting framework was used by the company, what 
justification method was used by the auditors, the lease classification criteria that 
triggered the capital lease classification, and the percentage discount of the renewal 
option.  Greater than 90% of the participants responded correctly to each question.  
Additionally, I asked each participant to rate the inherent flexibility of the accounting 
framework, and participants rated the principles-based standard as significantly more 
flexible [F (1,190) = 3.61, p = 0.030, one-tailed].   
 
Main Results 
 H1 predicts that when management evaluates an audit decision based only on the 
justification method, an auditor’s use of industry norms will be seen as more credible 
than the use of professional judgment.  In order to test H1, I performed an ANCOVA 
analysis using the likelihood that the auditor is correct as the DV.  I find that the overall 
model is significant at p = 0.000 with R2 = 0.10.  Auditors who use industry norms are 
perceived as more likely to be correct at F (1,188) = 13.04, p=0.000.  Since individuals 




without that same experience, I include this variable as a control and find that it is a 
significant covariate at F (1,188) = 6.11, p = 0.014.  Also, as part of the manipulation 
checks, I asked participants to rate the credibility of the auditor’s rationale for the lease 
adjustment.36  I find that participants rate industry norms to be significantly more credible 
(p = 0.022, one-tailed) than professional judgment.  Based on these results, I find support 
for H1.  See Table 13 for a summary of results for H1. 
 H2a and H2b predict that when management is able to evaluate audit decisions in 
a more realistic setting, management will focus on the accounting attributes of the 
auditor’s decision rather than the justification method.  To test these hypotheses, I 
perform two ANCOVA analyses: one with the likelihood that the auditor is correct as the 
DV and one with audit quality as the DV.  When using the likelihood that the auditor is 
correct, I find that the model is significant at p = 0.004 with R2 = 0.088.  As expected, the 
auditor’s justification method is not significant at F (1,185) = 0.70, p = 0.404, but the 
accounting attribute variable is moderately significant at F (1,185) = 2.31, p = 0.066 
(one-tailed).  Experience as an external auditor is included in the model as a control for 
the same reason discussed above.  I also include years of professional work experience as 
a control variable, since participants with more overall experience are likely to have more 
knowledge and experience to draw upon when evaluating auditors.  I find that prior 
experience as an external auditor and years of professional experience37 are significant 
covariates (p = 0.007 and p = 0.009, respectively).  
                                                 
36 Although I asked specifically about the credibility of the auditor’s rationale for the lease 
adjustment, the justification method used in Scenario 1 and Scenario 2 was identical for all participants. 
37 I also measured participants’ self-reported level of familiarity with U.S. GAAP, IFRS, and lease 
accounting.  None of these was found to be significant covariates with the DVs and were thus left out of the 




I find even stronger results when using audit quality as the DV.  This model is 
significant at p = 0.003 with R2 = 0.093.  The auditor’s justification method is still 
insignificant at F (1,185) = 0.77, p = 0.382.  The accounting attributes IV, however, is 
significant at F (1,185) = 4.06, p = 0.023 (one-tailed).  Both prior experience as an 
external auditor and years of professional work experience are significant covariates (p = 
0.006 and p = 0.015, respectively).   These results support H2a and H2b and provide 
evidence that management focuses on underlying accounting attributes, rather than an 
auditor’s justification method, when evaluating audit quality.  See Figure 7 and Table 14 
for a summary of results for H2. 
 H3 predicts that, when accounting standards are less precise, management will 
rate audit quality higher when auditors justify a decision using industry norms.  To test 
this hypothesis, I use a similar ANCOVA model as used to test H2, but I also include the 
precision variable and its interactions with the other treatment variables.  When using 
likelihood of the auditor’s decision being correct as the DV, I do not find the interaction 
between justification method and precision to be significant (p = 0.564).  I do find a 
significant interactive effect when I use audit quality as the DV at F (1,181) = 2.90, p = 
0.045 (one-tailed).  I also split the responses based on participants’ perceptions of the 
flexibility in the accounting standards and, using only participants that rated flexibility in 
the accounting standards as high, find similar results.  In order to understand the 
interaction effect, I analyzed only the responses for participants in the lower precision 
setting.  I run an ANCOVA analysis and find an auditor’s use of industry norms has a 
significantly positive effect on perceptions of audit quality at F (1,83) = 3.14, p = 0.040 




0.442).  These results indicate that as the accounting standards decrease in precision, 
management begins to rely on the justification method to determine audit quality.  See 
Figure 8 and Tables 15 and 16 for a summary of results for H3. 
 
Conclusion 
 This study makes several contributions to the accounting literature.  First, I find 
evidence that, although management perceives industry norms to be a more highly 
credible justification method than professional judgment, they will evaluate audit quality 
based upon the underlying accounting attributes and not the justification method when 
precision in the accounting standards is high.  On the other hand, as precision in the 
accounting standards decreases, management evaluates an audit decision as higher 
quality if the auditor justifies the decision using industry norms.  These findings 
contribute to our understanding of how auditor decisions impact management perceptions 
of audit quality, which helps to better understand auditor incentives.  I also show that 
auditors have an increased incentive to default to the use of industry norms when 
accounting standards become less precise, which informs the current discussion in the 
United States regarding the convergence with international accounting standards.   
The main limitation to this study relates to the demographics of the participants 
and their familiarity (or lack thereof) with IFRS.  Participants in this study were more 
familiar with U.S. GAAP, and their unfamiliarity with IFRS may change how they 
evaluate audit quality in this scenario.  The possibility remains that participants are more 
likely to use heuristic processing in the imprecise setting because they lack the same 




United States converges with IFRS, a certain learning curve is to be expected as existing 
standards are adjusted and new standards are adopted. These findings are still informative 
for the transition phase even if the effects become less pronounced as management gains 
experience in a more principles-based framework.       
Future research in this area may focus on recruiting participants that are familiar 
with IFRS to see if the results hold with more familiarity with that framework.  There are 
also other evaluators of audit quality, such as audit committee members, peer reviewers, 
and investors, that may impact audit decisions, and understanding their perceptions of 
audit quality will provide further insight into auditor incentives.  Additionally, other 
factors, such as increased cognitive load, method of communication, or level of 
distraction, may inhibit an evaluator’s ability to process systematically and may have an 
effect even when accounting standards are more precise.  Finally, other justification 
methods, such as the use of firm decision aids or judgment frameworks, may have a 
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Figure 7 – Management Perceptions of Audit Quality Based on Accounting 









































Figure 8: Management Perceptions of Audit Quality Based on Accounting 
Attributes and Justification Method (H3). A) Less Precise Accounting Standards B) 














































Table 12: Participant Demographics 
 
Cell 
Characteristic 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Total 
          
Participants 25 29 18 25 25 24 24 22 192 
                    Age (mean) 41 43 46 41 46 43 49 41 44 
                    Gender                   
Male 19 22 15 17 19 19 19 14 144 
Female 5 5 2 6 4 5 4 5 36 
                    Highest 
Education  
                  
Bachelors 7 10 4 8 10 8 9 3 59 
Masters 16 16 11 15 12 15 13 16 114 
Doctorate 1 1 2 0 1 1 1 0 7 
                    Highest Degree                    
Accounting 17 21 12 19 18 16 20 15 138 
Bus. Admin.  5 6 5 6 4 6 5 5 42 
Finance 1 3 2 0 3 3 3 0 15 
Other 2 0 1 3 7 1 2 3 19 
                    CPA License 15 14 10 13 9 16 14 8 99 
                    Audit Experience                   
External 14 13 7 14 9 12 13 8 90 
Internal 2 5 6 4 5 8 6 8 44 
Govt 2 2 2 1 2 3 3 1 16 
          Employed   23 25 15 21 21 21 20 18 164 
                    Work Exp. 
(mean) 
12 14 16 13 17 16 18 13 15 
          Job Title                   
CEO 1 1 3 0 4 2 1 0 12 
CFO 1 4 0 4 2 6 2 1 20 
VP Finance 0 0 1 0 1 3 0 1 6 
Dir. Fin. 
Rep. 
0 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 4 
Controller 6 0 2 3 2 5 4 4 26 
Acctg 
Manager 
3 6 1 6 3 1 2 4 26 
Other* 13 14 9 9 11 7 14 9 86 
          
* Participants in this category described their position using some of the following titles: accountant, 
administrative director, auditor, budget manager, chief internal auditor, COO, director, owner, partner, 





Table 13: Descriptive and ANCOVA Analysis for Likelihood that Auditor 
Decision Is Correct (H1) 
            
            





 norms       
Mean 3.28 3.78       
St. Dev. 0.96 0.94       
n= 97 95       
            
            
ANCOVA analysis           




Square F p-value 
External audit experience 1 5.33 5.33 6.11 0.014 







Table 14: Descriptive and ANCOVA Analysis for Perception of Audit Quality 
Based on Accounting Attributes and Justification Method (H2) 
            
            





 norms Total     
Conservative 3.83 3.93 3.88     
  (1.06) (1.18) (1.11)     
  n=54 n=45 n=99     
            
Aggressive 4.09 4.24 4.17     
  (1.17) (1.08) (1.12)     
  n=43 n=50 n=93     
            
Total 3.95 4.09 4.02     
  (1.11) (1.13) (1.12)     
  n=97 n=95 n=192     
            
            
ANCOVA analysis         




Square F p-value 
External audit 
experience 1 8.91 8.91 7.60 0.006 
Professional experience 1 7.06 7.06 6.03 0.015 
Justification method 1 0.90 0.90 0.77 0.380 
Accounting attributes 1 4.76 4.76 4.06 0.0225* 
Justification*Attributes 1 0.36 0.36 0.31 0.578 
            





Table 15: ANCOVA Analysis for Perception of Audit Quality Based on 
Accounting Attributes, Framework, and Justification Method (H3) 
            
            
            




Square F p-value 
External audit experience 1 9.86 9.86 8.40 0.004 
Professional experience 1 5.28 5.28 4.50 0.035 
Justification method 1 1.11 1.11 0.95 0.331 
Accounting attributes 1 3.97 3.97 3.38 0.034* 
Framework 1 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.948 
Justification*Attributes 1 0.47 0.47 0.40 0.527 
Justification*Framework 1 3.40 3.40 2.90 0.045* 
Attributes*Framework 1 0.98 0.98 0.83 0.362 
3-way interaction 1 0.31 0.31 0.27 0.607 
            









Table 16: Descriptive and ANCOVA Analysis for Perception of Audit Quality 
Based on Accounting Attributes and Justification Method under Low Precision 
(H3) 
            
            





 norms Total     
Conservative 3.76 4.14 3.94     
  (1.10) (1.13) (1.07)     
  n=25 n=22 n=47     
            
Aggressive 3.78 4.28 4.07     
  (1.40) (1.14) (1.26)     
  n=18 n=25 n=43     
            
Total 3.77 4.21 4.00     
  (1.17) (1.12) (1.16)     
  n=43 n=47 n=90     
            
            
ANCOVA analysis           




Square F p-value 
External audit 
experience 1 1.07 1.07 0.83 0.366 
Professional experience 1 5.07 5.07 3.91 0.051 
Justification method 1 4.06 4.06 3.14 0.040* 
Accounting attributes 1 0.78 0.78 0.60 0.442 
Justification*Attributes 1 0.54 0.54 0.41 0.522 
            










In this dissertation I investigate questions related to management perceptions of 
audit quality.  After reviewing the literature related to audit quality, including perceptions 
of audit quality, and the impact of principles-based accounting standards on auditor and 
management decision making, I identified two major questions that have not been 
addressed in accounting research.  First, what factors are important to management for 
defining and evaluating audit quality?  Second, how does an auditor’s use of industry 
norms under imprecise accounting guidance impact management perceptions of audit 
quality?   
In order to answer these questions, I conducted two related studies.  First, I 
surveyed management participants about how they define audit quality and how auditors 
are able to demonstrate audit quality on an engagement.  I find that when defining audit 
quality, management focuses on input, process, and output characteristics; however, they 
focus mostly on input and process characteristics when evaluating auditors.  I also find 
that interpersonal relationships, especially related to communication between 
management and auditors, are very important to management.   
Second, I performed an experiment that investigates the impact of an auditor’s use 




find that when accounting standards are more precise, an auditor’s justification method 
does not impact management perceptions of audit quality; rather, management focuses on 
the underlying accounting attributes of the adjustment and uses that information to 
evaluate the audit quality provided.  When accounting standards are less precise, 
however, audit quality is rated higher when auditors justify a decision using an industry 
norm.  Thus, auditors are incentivized to engage in herding behavior and default to 
following an industry norm when accounting standards are imprecise, regardless of 
whether or not that industry norm is the most appropriate method of accounting for a 
transaction. 
There are two primary limitations to this research.  First, the participant group 
consisted of individuals who are primarily familiar with US GAAP.  Since Chapter 4 
investigates differences between a rules-based and principles-based accounting 
framework, the results of this research may be driven by the background of the 
participants more so than by the manipulations of the experiment.  Future research would 
benefit from similar experiments that include participants who are more familiar with 
IFRS.   
The second limitation relates to the format of the exploratory research in Chapter 
3.  The survey questions were administered in conjunction with the experiment 
performed in Chapter 4, which caused two potential problems.  First, the requested 
information had to be limited in order to avoid increasing the time of participation (and 
thus reducing the response rate).  Second, the online format used for data collection 
prevented any follow up questions that arose during analysis.  Future research in this area 




provide management participants an opportunity to elaborate on questions and provide 
more context around finding from the initial analysis. 
Future research in this area can continue along two related paths.  The first is to 
look at additional auditor decisions and understand how they impact management 
perceptions of audit quality.  Potential auditor decisions that could be investigated 
include: amount and type of evidence reviewed by auditors, level of manager and partner 
involvement in the early stages of the audit, and types of audit tests performed.  Some of 
these areas have been investigated for their impact on an engagement review (i.e., when a 
supervisor auditor reviews the work of a junior member of the engagement team), but 
there has been much less work performed on the impact of these decisions on 
management.  
The second potential area for future research involves investigating how auditor 
decisions are perceived by other stakeholders in the audit process, such as audit 
committees, regulators, investors, and quality control reviewers.  Although some prior 
research has investigated how these different groups perceive audit quality, each group is 
underrepresented in the accounting literature when compared to the amount of research 
on juror perceptions of audit quality.  Thus, there is a significant opportunity to broaden 









Screening Questions for Eligibility 
(All Conditions) 
 
The following questions will help to determine if you have the type of work experience 
that is being targeted by this study. 
 





2. Do you currently, or have you ever, had responsibility over any aspect of the 
financial reporting process for an employer?  Examples may include, but are not 
limited to:     
 Performance of, or supervision over, any of the activities included below: 
- Preparation of any part of a quarterly or annual financial report 
- Preparation of month-end or period-end closing or adjusting entries 
- Preparation of company budgets or revenue forecasts 
- Design or implementation of controls over the financial reporting 
process 





3. Do you currently, or have you ever, interacted with your company’s external 
auditor in the normal course of business? 
 
a. Yes 




Statement of Consent 
(All Conditions) 
 
Evaluating Management Perceptions of Audit Quality 
The purpose of this research study is to understand how auditor decisions impact 
management perceptions. We are doing this study because we would like to better 
understand the implications of audit decisions, which may help auditors and management 
to be more aligned in the audit process.  
As part of this study you will be asked to imagine yourself as controller of a company.  
You will be presented with the information surrounding a current year audit and asked to 
make judgments related to several proposed audit adjustments.   
After making the above judgments, you will be asked several questions that will help the 
researcher to ensure the manipulations of the experiment were both clearly understood 
and effective.  Finally, you will be asked to provide some basic demographic information.  
The demographic information will assist in analyzing the data for trends, relationships, 
etc.   No personally identifiable information will be collected and all responses will 
remain anonymous.  All information collected will reside in the possession of the primary 
investigator and will only be used for analysis related to the stated research interests.     
If you have any questions or complaints, or if you feel you have been harmed by this 
research please contact Erik Boyle, David Eccles School of Business, (801) 678-7175 or 
erik.boyle@business.utah.edu.   
Contact the Institutional Review Board (IRB) if you have questions regarding your rights 
as a research participant. Also, contact the IRB if you have questions, complaints or 
concerns which you do not feel you can discuss with the investigator. The University of 
Utah IRB may be reached by phone at (801) 581-3655 or by e-mail at irb@hsc.utah.edu.   
It should take 15-20 minutes to complete the questionnaire. Participation in this study is 
voluntary. You can choose not to take part. You can choose not to finish the 
questionnaire or omit any question you prefer not to answer without penalty or loss of 
benefits.   
By submitting this questionnaire, you are giving your consent to participate. 
 





Part 1 Introduction 
(All Conditions) 
 
In Part 1 of this study, you will be asked to assume the role of the controller for your 
company and will respond to a proposed audit adjustment over the allowance for doubtful 




Justification Method Baseline Measure 
(Professional Judgment Condition) 
 
ALLOWANCE FOR DOUBTFUL ACCOUNTS 
 
Imagine you are the controller of your company.  One of the significant balances on your 
financial statements is the Allowance for Doubtful Accounts.  You have prepared an 
analysis of outstanding Accounts Receivables (AR) and calculated an allowance based on 
a percentage of outstanding receivables in the different AR classifications (e.g. <30 days 
outstanding, 30-60 days, 90-120 days, etc.). Because this is the first year of your 
company’s existence, you are not able to rely on prior history to determine the most 
likely percentage of uncollectible accounts in each classification, but you do have 15 
years of experience in a similar industry.   
 
During your year-end audit, the audit manager expresses a belief that the Allowance for 
Doubtful Accounts is too low and proposes an audit adjustment to increase the amount.  
When you ask why an adjustment is necessary, you are told that, based on the audit 
manager’s own professional judgment and expertise, the allowance is insufficient to 






Justification Method Baseline Measure 
(Industry Norms Condition) 
 
ALLOWANCE FOR DOUBTFUL ACCOUNTS 
 
Imagine you are the controller of your company.  One of the significant balances on your 
financial statements is the Allowance for Doubtful Accounts.  You have prepared an 
analysis of outstanding Accounts Receivables (AR) and calculated an allowance based on 
a percentage of outstanding receivables in the different AR classifications (e.g. <30 days 
outstanding, 30-60 days, 90-120 days, etc.). Because this is the first year of your 
company’s existence, you are not able to rely on prior history to determine the most 
likely percentage of uncollectible accounts in each classification, but you do have 15 
years of experience in a similar industry.   
 
During your year-end audit, the audit manager expresses a belief that the Allowance for 
Doubtful Accounts is too low and proposes an audit adjustment to increase the amount.  
When you ask why an adjustment is necessary, you are told that, based on a comparison 
with the allowances of other companies in the same industry, the allowance is 






Part 1 Dependent Variable 
(All Conditions) 
 
1. What do you believe is the likelihood that the auditor’s decision to increase the 























Part 2 Introduction 
(All Conditions) 
 
You will now begin Part 2 of the study.  In Part 2, you will again assume the role of 
controller, although for a different company than Part 1.  This time you will be asked to 






(More Precision Condition) 
 
LEASE CRITERIA 
In order to complete this task, it is important that you understand the accounting 
standards related to lease classification under United States Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles (U.S. GAAP).  U.S. GAAP is generally considered to be a rules-
based framework and is characterized by detailed guidance and specific bright-line tests 
for determining the appropriate accounting treatment for transactions.  Thus, the focus is 
on correctly applying specific rules to accounting transactions. 
From a lessee’s perspective, all leases are classified as either capital or operating leases.  
Differences in these leases will be explained on a following page.  Under U.S. GAAP, a 
lease MUST be classified as a capital lease if it meets any one of four criteria.  For 
purposes of this study, only one criterion needs to be considered: 
If the lease term is equal to 75% or more of the estimated economic life of the 
leased property, then the lease must be classified as a capital lease.      
NOTE: A bargain renewal option is an option to renew a lease at a price sufficiently 
below market value such that the exercise of the option is reasonably assured at the date 
of the lease’s inception.  The lease term includes the bargain renewal period.  Not all 






(Less Precision Condition) 
 
LEASE CRITERIA 
In this section, you will evaluate a proposed audit adjustment.  In order to complete this 
task, it is important that you understand the accounting standards related to lease 
classification under International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS).  IFRS is 
generally considered to be a principles-based framework and is characterized by a lack of 
detailed guidance and specific bright-line tests for determining the appropriate accounting 
treatment for transactions.  Thus, the focus is on correctly applying overarching 
principles to specific accounting transactions. 
From a lessee’s perspective, all leases are classified as either finance or operating leases.  
Differences in these leases will be explained on a following page.  Under IFRS, a lease 
MUST be classified as a finance lease if it transfers substantially all of the risks and 
rewards of ownership.  The standard lists several criteria that MAY indicate this 
threshold has been met.  For purposes of this study, only one criterion needs to be 
considered: 
If the lease term is for the major part of the estimated economic life of the leased 
property, then the lease may need to be classified as a finance lease.    
NOTE: A bargain renewal option is an option to renew a lease at a price sufficiently 
below market value such that the exercise of the option is reasonably assured at the date 
of the lease’s inception.  The lease term includes the bargain renewal period.  Not all 









1. Which accounting framework was discussed on the previous page? 
a. United States Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (US GAAP) 
b. International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) 
c. Both  
d. Neither 
 
2. Based on the information provided, what is the criterion for determining how a 
lease should be classified? 
a. The lease term is equal to 60% or more of the estimated economic life of 
the leased property. 
b. The lease term is equal to 75% or more of the estimated economic life of 
the leased property. 
c. The lease term is equal to 90% or more of the estimated economic life of 
the leased property. 









(More Precision Condition) 
 
RECORDING THE LEASE 
 
For financial statement purposes, a capital lease is recorded as a purchase of an asset.  
An operating lease is recorded as a rental.  The table below summarizes the main 
differences. 
 Capital Lease Operating Lease 
Balance Sheet 
Effects 
An asset and an associated 
liability are recorded on the 
balance sheet at the present 
value of the future minimum 
lease payments. 
There are no entries made that 




Depreciation and interest 
expense are recorded on the 
income statement over the life 
of the lease. 
Rental expense is recorded on 
the income statement over the 
life of the lease. 
Other Effects 
Reduces income more in the 
early years of a lease as interest 
expense is higher. 
Reduces income more in the 
later years of a lease as interest 
expense is lower. 
 
Companies typically prefer to record a lease as an operating lease for at least three 
reasons: 
1. Liabilities on the balance sheet are lower. 
2. Expenses are lower in the early periods of the lease. 






(Less Precision Condition) 
 
RECORDING THE LEASE 
 
For financial statement purposes, a finance lease is recorded as a purchase of an asset.  
An operating lease is recorded as a rental.  The table below summarizes the main 
differences. 
 Finance Lease Operating Lease 
Balance Sheet 
Effects 
An asset and an associated 
liability are recorded on the 
balance sheet at the present 
value of the future minimum 
lease payments. 
There are no entries made that 




Depreciation and interest 
expense are recorded on the 
income statement over the life 
of the lease. 
Rental expense is recorded on 
the income statement over the 
life of the lease. 
Other Effects 
Reduces income more in the 
early years of a lease as interest 
expense is higher. 
Reduces income more in the 
later years of a lease as interest 
expense is lower. 
 
Companies typically prefer to record a lease as an operating lease for at least three 
reasons: 
1. Liabilities on the balance sheet are lower. 
2. Expenses are lower in the early periods of the lease. 






Part 2 Overview 




Beck Industries (the Company) is a manufacturer of medical imaging equipment.  They 
were founded in 1988 and initially focused on manufacturing X-ray machines.  As the 
Company grew, both internally and through mergers with other private medical imaging 
companies, they branched into the manufacture of both Computed Tomography (CT) and 
Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) scanners.  In 1997 the company undertook an Initial 
Public Offering (IPO) and is currently listed on the New York Stock Exchange.  Beck 
Industries operates in accordance with United States Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles (U.S. GAAP), which is typically described as a rules-based accounting 
framework.  The Company has experienced relatively steady net income over the last 10 
years.  The Company’s main competitors are Hitachi, Toshiba, Siemens, Phillips, and 
GE. 
You are the controller for Beck Industries, a position that you have held for the last 7 
years.  As the controller, you act as the main liaison between the auditors and the rest of 
the Company’s management group. 
Prior to 2002, the Company used a regional auditing firm as their auditor.  In 2002, the 
Company decided to separate the sources of their auditing and consulting services.  The 
Company decided to use their previous auditors as their primary financial consultants and 
to engage a new audit firm.  After a competitive bidding process, the Company hired a 
Big 4 auditor, and this firm is the Company’s current auditor.  The Company has always 
enjoyed a good relationship with the audit firm.  The manager on the current year’s audit 
is Taylor Emery.  This is the 2nd year that Taylor has been the lead manager on this audit, 
and the Company was pleased with his performance on last year’s audit.  
The auditors are currently performing the testwork for the year-end audit.  The deadline 
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Beck Industries (the Company) is a manufacturer of medical imaging equipment.  They 
were founded in 1988 and initially focused on manufacturing X-ray machines.  As the 
Company grew, both internally and through mergers with other private medical imaging 
companies, they branched into the manufacture of both Computed Tomography (CT) and 
Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) scanners.  In 1997 the company undertook an Initial 
Public Offering (IPO) and is currently listed on the London Stock Exchange.  Beck 
Industries operates in accordance with International Financial Accounting Standards 
(IFRS), which is typically described as a principles-based accounting framework.  The 
Company has experienced relatively steady net income over the last 10 years.  The 
Company’s main competitors are Hitachi, Toshiba, Siemens, Phillips, and GE. 
You are the controller for Beck Industries, a position that you have held for the last 7 
years.  As the controller, you act as the main liaison between the auditors and the rest of 
the Company’s management group. 
Prior to 2002, the Company used a regional auditing firm as their auditor.  In 2002, the 
Company decided to separate the sources of their auditing and consulting services.  The 
Company decided to use their previous auditors as their primary financial consultants and 
to engage a new audit firm.  After a competitive bidding process, the Company hired a 
Big 4 auditor, and this firm is the Company’s current auditor.  The Company has always 
enjoyed a good relationship with the audit firm.  The manager on the current year’s audit 
is Taylor Emery.  This is the 2nd year that Taylor has been the lead manager on this audit, 
and the Company was pleased with his performance on last year’s audit.  
The auditors are currently performing the testwork for the year-end audit.  The deadline 










On February 9, 2013, Taylor Emery met with you to provide an update on the audit.  
During this meeting you were presented with 3 audit adjustments that the audit team was 
recommending based on the results of their testwork.  
Adjustment #1:   
After evaluating the proposed adjustment, you agree with the auditors and decide to 
record the adjustment. 
Adjustment #2:   
After evaluating the proposed adjustment, you disagree with the auditors’ 
decision.  After you provide them with some additional information, the auditors 










The 3rd proposed audit adjustment relates to the classification of several leases that were 
entered into during the year.  You will be asked to respond to this adjustment.  The 
following is a description of the lease transactions:   
On January 1, 2013, the Company entered into lease agreements for three identical 
machines that are used to manufacture MRI scanners.  Due to the cost of the machines, 
these transactions have a significant impact on the company’s financial statements.  The 
terms of the lease are as follows:   
 Estimated economic life: 21 years 
 Lease term: 13 years (62% of the estimated economic life) 
 Annual lease payment: $600,000/month ($200,000 for each machine)  
 Renewal option: At the end of the lease term, the company may extend the lease 
for 3 additional years.   
o If the option is exercised, the lease payment for the additional years will 
be at a discount of 30% below the market rental value of the equipment at 
that point in time. 
After a thorough review of all relevant lease details, the Company determined that the 
lease should be classified as an operating lease.  The Company’s senior management 
group feels very strongly that this is the appropriate classification. Additionally, 










The 3rd proposed audit adjustment relates to the classification of several leases that were 
entered into during the year.  You will be asked to respond to this adjustment.  The 
following is a description of the lease transactions:   
On January 1, 2013, the Company entered into lease agreements for three identical 
machines that are used to manufacture MRI scanners.  Due to the cost of the machines, 
these transactions have a significant impact on the company’s financial statements.  The 
terms of the lease are as follows:   
 Estimated economic life: 21 years 
 Lease term: 13 years (62% of the estimated economic life) 
 Annual lease payment: $600,000/month ($200,000 for each machine)  
 Renewal option: At the end of the lease term, the company may extend the lease 
for 3 additional years.  .   
o If the option is exercised, the lease payment for the additional years will at 
a discount of 10% below the market rental value of the equipment at that 
point in time. 
After a thorough review of all relevant lease details, the Company determined that the 
lease should be classified as an operating lease.  The Company’s senior management 
group feels very strongly that this is the appropriate classification.  Additionally, 





Proposed Audit Adjustment #3 
(More Precision & Professional Judgment Conditions) 
 
PROPOSED AUDIT ADJUSTMENT #3 
 
After reviewing the lease contracts, the auditors came to the following preliminary 
conclusions: 
 The discount on the renewal option was large enough that it should be 
classified as a bargain renewal option. 
 If the renewal option is classified as a bargain, the lease term covers 76% of 
the estimated economic life of the asset.  The auditors believe this to be a 
large enough percentage that the lease should be classified as a capital lease. 
Taylor explained that this decision was based on evaluating the terms of the lease using 





Proposed Audit Adjustment #3 
(Less Precision & Professional Judgment Conditions) 
 
PROPOSED AUDIT ADJUSTMENT #3 
 
After reviewing the lease contracts, the auditors came to the following preliminary 
conclusions: 
 The discount on the renewal option was large enough that it should be 
classified as a bargain renewal option. 
 If the renewal option is classified as a bargain, the lease term covers 76% of 
the estimated economic life of the asset.  The auditors believe this to be a 
large enough percentage that the lease should be classified as a finance lease. 
Taylor explained that this decision was based on evaluating the terms of the lease using 





Proposed Audit Adjustment #3 
(More Precision & Industry Norms Conditions) 
 
PROPOSED AUDIT ADJUSTMENT #3 
 
After reviewing the lease contracts, the auditors came to the following conclusions: 
- The discount on the renewal option was large enough that it should be classified 
as a bargain renewal option. 
- If the renewal option is classified as a bargain, the lease term covers 76% of the 
estimated economic life of the asset.  The auditors determined this to be a large 
enough percentage that the lease should be classified as a capital lease. 
Taylor explained that this decision was based on a comparison of the lease with similar 





Proposed Audit Adjustment #3 
(Less Precision & Industry Norms Conditions) 
 
PROPOSED AUDIT ADJUSTMENT #3 
 
After reviewing the lease contracts, the auditors came to the following conclusions: 
- The discount on the renewal option was large enough that it should be classified 
as a bargain renewal option. 
- If the renewal option is classified as a bargain, the lease term covers 76% of the 
estimated economic life of the asset.  The auditors determined this to be a large 
enough percentage that the lease should be classified as a finance lease. 
Taylor explained that this decision was based on a comparison of the lease with similar 






Adjusted Trial Balance 
(All Conditions) 
 
ADJUSTED TRIAL BALANCE 
 









Current Assets 10,054         10,054         
PPE 4,629           6,064                10,693         
AD (2,611)         (288)                  (2,899)         
Other Assets 5,313           5,313           
Total Assets 17,385         23,161         
Liabilities
Liabilities 13,427         5,828                19,255         
Equity
Equity 3,958           (53)                    3,905           
Total Liabilities and Equity 17,385         23,161         
Revenues
Revenues 7,403           7,403           
Expenses
Cost of Goods Sold 3,866           3,866           
Selling, General & Administrative 1,189           (600)                  589              
Depreciation & Amortization 986              289                   1,275           
Interest & other financial 250              364                   614              
Other expenses 887              887              
Other (175)            (175)            






Part 2 Dependent Variables 
(All Conditions) 
 
1. What do you believe is the likelihood that the auditor’s decision to change the 
















2. Based on the information provided, would you revise your financial statements to 











4. Please list any additional information that you would like to have from the auditor 










For the questions on the next page, assume the auditor requires you to change the lease 




5. Based on the information provided, how would you rate the quality of the audit 


















6. Based on the information provided, what would be your recommendation for 














7. Would your answer to Question #6 change if you could be assured that you would 




8. If you could be assured that you would have a different manager on the 
engagement, what would be your recommendation for engaging this audit firm for 

















Manipulation Check and Demographics Introduction 
(All Conditions) 
 
MANIPULATION AND DEMOGRAPHIC QUESTIONS 
 
You have now completed the audit evaluation portion of the study.  On the next few 
pages you will be asked some questions to ensure the study was clearly understood.  You 





Manipulation Check Questions 
(All Conditions) 
 
1. Under which accounting framework did Beck Industries operate? 
a. United States Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (US GAAP) 
b. International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) 
c. Both  
d. Neither 
 
2. Based on information provided in this questionnaire, what was the criterion for 
determining how a lease should be classified? 
a. The lease term is equal to 60% or more of the estimated economic life of 
the leased property. 
b. The lease term is equal to 75% or more of the estimated economic life of 
the leased property. 
c. The lease term is equal to 90% or more of the estimated economic life of 
the leased property. 
d. The lease term is for the major part of the estimated economic life of the 
leased property. 
 
3. Which of the following did the auditors use to justify their decision to propose an 
adjustment to the lease classification? 
a. Professional judgment 
b. Firm provided interpretive guidance 
c. Comparison with similar leases within the industry 
d. Results from a firm decision aid 
 
4. Please rate your agreement with the following statement: 
 













5. Please rate your agreement with the following statement as it relates to the lease 
accounting standard:  
 
The accounting standard provides enough flexibility that the leases can be 



















7. What discount did Beck Industries receive if they chose to exercise the renewal 
option? 
a. 5% below fair market value 
b. 10% below fair market value 
c. 20% below fair market value 
d. 30% below fair market value 
 


















Less Precision Lease Term Percentage Manipulation Check 
(Less Precision Condition) 
 
In relation to the lease classification criterion, what percentage of an asset’s economic 
life, in your opinion, would need to be covered in order to be considered “for the major 
part”?  In other words, fill in the blank in the following statement.    
 
Leases with a lease term that covers _____% or more of an asset’s estimated economic 





US GAAP Lease Standard Manipulation Check 
(Less Precision Condition) 
 
1. United States Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (U.S. GAAP) also 
contains guidance related to how lease terms impact the classification for 
leases.  If you are familiar with the guidance in the United States, please fill in the 
blank for the following statement.  Otherwise, please select "I am not familiar 
with this guidance."     
 
If the lease term is equal to ___________ of the estimated economic life of the 
leased property, then the lease must be classified as a capital lease.  Otherwise, 
the lease should be classified as an operating lease. 
 
a. 60% or more 
b. 75% or more 
c. 90% or more 
d. The major part 
e. I am not familiar with this guidance 
 
2. Please indicate the extent to which you relied on your knowledge of the lease 
classification guidance under U.S. GAAP in order to evaluate the auditor's 

















IFRS Lease Standard Manipulation Check 
(More Precision Condition) 
 
1. International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) also contains guidance related 
to how lease terms impact the classification for leases.  If you are familiar with 
the International guidance, please fill in the blank for the following 
statement.  Otherwise, please select "I am not familiar with this guidance."     
 
If the lease term is for ___________ of the estimated economic life of the leased 
property, then the lease may need to be classified as a finance lease. 
 
a. 60% or more 
b. 75% or more 
c. 90% or more 
d. The major part 
e. I am not familiar with this guidance 
 
2. Please indicate the extent to which you relied on your knowledge of the lease 
classification guidance under IFRS in order to evaluate the auditor's decision to 


































3. What is the highest level of education you have completed? 
a. High school 
b. Associates degree 
c. Bachelors degree 
d. Masters degree 
e. Doctorate degree 
f. Other professional degree (please describe)_____________ 
 
4. In what subject(s) did you receive your highest degree? 
a. Accounting 




f. Information systems 
g. Operations 
h. Other (please list)__________________ 
 





















9. Do you, or have you ever, worked as the following types of auditor? 
 
External Yes No 
Internal Yes No 
Governmental Yes No 
 
10. With the exception of any time spent as an external auditor, what is the 
approximate number of audit engagements on which you have had direct 























      
IFRS 






























      
 
13. Please indicate the extent to which you agree with the following statements based 
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14. Please indicate the extent to which you agree with the following statement:  When 
accounting standards are flexible and/or ambiguous, a company will always 
improve financial statement quality by making their accounting similar to the 
accounting of industry peers. 
 







15. Please select your job title? 
a. CEO 
b. CFO 
c. Vic President of Finance 
d. Director of Financial Reporting 
e. Controller 
f. Accounting Manager 
g. Other (please describe)_________________ 
  
16. In what industry would you classify your employer? Note: The following 
industries are classified by SIC code.  Please select the best response. 




e. Transportation, Communications, Electric, Gas, and Sanitary Services 
f. Wholesale Trade 
g. Retail Trade 
h. Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate 
i. Services 
j. Public Administration 
 
17. Which of the following best describes your employer? 
a. Privately owned 
b. Publicly traded 





18. In what region of the country is your employer headquartered?  Note: Please refer 
to the regions listed in the picture above.38 
a. New England 
b. Mideast 
c. Southeast 
d. Great Lakes 
e. Plains 
f. Rocky Mountain 
g. Southwest 
h. Far West 
i. My company is not headquartered in the United States 
The following question is only shown if participants select the last response from 
Question #18. 
19. Where is your employer headquartered? 
a. North America (excluding the U.S.) 
b. Central America 
c. South American 
d. Europe 
e. Asia 
f. Middle East 
g. Africa 
h. Australia or the Pacific Islands 
i. Other______________________ 
 












d. Other (please)________________________ 
 
                                                 


















Audit Quality Survey Introduction 
(All Conditions) 
 
For the final part of this study, you will be asked to respond to a couple of questions 




Audit Quality Survey Questions 
(All Conditions) 
 










2. Please describe way(s) that external auditors have demonstrated high audit quality.  
Please focus only on interactions that you have had with auditors during a time you 












3. The Center for Audit Quality recently identified several potential indicators of audit 
quality.  Please rate how valuable knowledge of the information contained in each of 
the following categories would be for evaluating audit quality. 
 
Firm Leadership and Tone 










      
Knowledge and 











      











      
Trends in Engagement 










      
Allocation of Resources 










      












      























      
Reissuance Restatements 
















4. In reference to the company your currently work for, please assess the level of 




































































































Thank you for your participation in this study.  As a token of appreciation, you may 
choose one of the following options:      
1. You may choose to receive a $10 gift card from Amazon.com.  If you select this 
option, you will need to enter a valid email address.  Your email address will not 
be shared with any third-party and will be used only for distribution of the gift 
card.     
2. You may choose to have $10 donated on your behalf to one of the following 
charitable organizations: 
a. The University of Utah David Eccles School of Business General 
Scholarship Fund    
b. The American Red Cross    
c. Huntsman Cancer Institute    
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